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This research deals with the econometric estimation of supply and input 
demand elasticities. The use of an endogenous technology approach is this 
study's distinctive feature, and the implications for policy analysis of such 
estimates are its main concern. This first chapter will provide background 
information on the relevance of the study, anda detailed specification of the 
research objectives and organization. 
The long-term problem of agriculture is its inability to clear, in the short 
run, the amount of resources available with those used in production. Following 
T.W. Schultz's (1953) definition, the farm problem is characterized by a trend of 
supply outgrowing demand an,d excess resources committed to agriculture 
need to be taken out. Studies by Heady, Haroldsen, Meyer and Tweeten 
(1965), Tweeten (1979, 1989), Hallberg (1989) indicate that agricultural 
adjustments are slow and easily disrupted by exogenous shoc~s. This lack of a 
quick resource adjustment is the cause of low returns and excess capacity in 
agriculture. Slow resource adjustment also is a reason for government 
intervention. 
Technological change in agriculture has become both a solution and 
burden to the farm problem and to society's welfare. Cochrane's tread mill is a 
graphic image of the relationship between technical progress and agriculture's 
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long-term problem. The increase in productivity achieved during the past half 
century, while providing low cost food stuffs, has added new pressures to 
balance productive resources in agriculture. 
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It is unclear if government policy has contributed to alleviating or 
aggravating the situation in agriculture; there are strong arguments on both 
sides. However, policy analysts must recognize the current trend to move away 
from government intervention. Therefore, it is necessary to sort out what is 
needed from what is accessory in agricultural policies. 
Often, the analysis of agricultural policy implies looking into each of its 
components separately: income support, supply control, research policy, export 
enhancing mechanisms. Most studies ignore the links among the different 
components, although some of those links do have a significant impact. For 
example, research output affects the performance of income support or supply 
control programs; new technologies allow changes in the production function 
which in turn changes the quantity and kind of the resources used. On the other 
hand, income support or supply control programs might have an impact on 
speeding or slowing the adoption of new technology. Isolated evaluations of 
policies which are closely related are likely to render misleading results. The 
above calls for an integrated assessment of the effects of public policy. 
Two major areas of government intervention have been supply control 
and disposal and scientific and technological research support. An apparent 
contradiction seems to exist between these two components, which is a matter 
of this research and is discussed later. 
Most studies of these policies focus on only one of the two components, 
either supply control and disposal, or scientific and technological research 
support. Since the late 1960's, several studies by Houck, Ryan, Abel, 
Gallagher, Penn, Subotnik and others have focused on commodity programs 
and primarily investigated the expected price formulation induced by policy 
intervention. On the other hand, studies by Griliches (1958; 1963; 1964), 
Peterson (1967; 1971), Evenson (1967; 1968; 1974; 1984), Cline (1975), 
Huffman and Miranowski (1981 ), among many others, focus on the measures, 
determinants, and of the rate of return on public research policy. While both 
areas of research have produced significant contributions to the agricultural 
policy literature, there is a need for incorporating the interaction effects among 
different sets of policy mechanisms. 
The work of Gardner (1988), Oehmke (1988), Oehmke and Yao (1990), 
and Oehmke and Chan Choe {1991) are the best, but yet incomplete, attempts 
to take into account the link between public research and commodity programs 
in agricultural policy evaluation. Oehmke and Yao•s empirical study lacks 
consistency insofar as the elasticities• estimates used do not take into account 
the interaction between public research and income support or supply control 
policies. 
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From a different angle, studies by Alston, Edwards and Freebairn (1988), 
Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986), Oehmke (1988), and de Gorter and Norton 
(1989), focus on farm programs' effects on benefits from research. The basic 
conclusion of these studies is that ignoring government policies overestimates 
benefits from research. De Gorter and Norton (1989) also argue that the 
overestimation is not significant. 
The implications of the government policies in question, income support 
and public research, reach beyond the issue of economic efficiency. Rausser 
(1982) views public policy as a mixture of two types of policies. Policies whose 
primary objective is to improve economic, efficiency, i.e., increase the size of the 
pie; and policies which objective is to redistribute wealth among social groups, 
i.e., allocate the portions of the pie. 
These two types of policies, which Rausser calls PERT and PEST1 
respectively, reflect different and opposite ways to view public policy. The first 
type is the more traditional view which holds that government intervenes to 
overcome market failures. The basic assumption is that government is benign, 
and its intervention improves efficiency. 
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The second view, based on the public choice literature, considers that 
government policies are introduced to transfer wealth from one group in society 
to another. The government is viewed purely as a mechanism to transfer 
wealth. The government is not an autonomous neutral entity. Powerful interest 
groups seeking their own benefit manipulate public policies in their behalf. The 
policy process is then a competition among interest groups to dictate the design 
and implementation of government policies. 
Rausser's joint approach to public policy not only avoids the two 
\, 
extremes positions, but provides a framework to integrate efficiency (welfare) 
and distributional issues as two sides of the same coin. PERT and PEST 
policies are inseparable and complementary in a policy decision. 
Public policy is a mixture of PERT and PEST policies. The proportion of 
the mixture will depend on the way .the intended government intervention net 
benefits (costs) are distributed among social groups, and on the relative political 
influence of each group. Efficiency outcomes of PERT policies do not have a 
neutral impact on. wealth distribution. Therefore, PEST policies could be 
necessary to compensate losers. So PERT activities become not only 
applicable, but also Pareto optimal. 
Consequently with Rausser's view, research policy is a PERT activity, 
whose the objective· is to achieve a higher degree of efficiency and social 
1 Rausser (1982) defines PERT and PEST as Political Economic Resource Transaction, 
and Political Economic-Seeking Transfer respectively. 
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welfare. Meanwhile, income support programs are PEST policies, whose basic 
objective is to transfer resources to producers in order to allow them to adopt 
the new technology available and fulfill society's goal. 
Technical changes are possible i~, and only if, new basic knowledge is 
produced and transformed into applied knowledge. Public research policy has 
made an important contribution to the productivity growth of American 
agriculture. Whereas, generating Jechn9logies that ,increase or maintain 
productivity levels, the contribution of public research has been significant. The 
complexities of generating and adopting new technologies .will be addressed 
later. 
Recent studies put public research rate of return estimates in a range from 
31 o/o (Ortiz and Norton, 1990) to 202% (Smith, ~orton and Havlicek, 1983)2. A 
recent study by Pr~y and Neumeyer (1990) suggests that public research 
stimulates private research. , 
As depicted by most economists, the farm problem is a production 
economics issue. Most agricultural products are own price inelastic and 
inferior goods. Also, the level of consumer satiation of food stuff is rapidly 
achieved. Moreover, export demand is not only a function of structural variables 
such as income and population; it also is greatly influenced by random events 
such as weather and third-country policies. Tweeten (1979), argues that there 
is not much to be done in the.domestic demand structure; and. due to the 
instability of export demand, researchers have to investigate the production 
side to uncover answers to the farm problem. 
The relative sizes of the supply and input demand elasticities are 
2 A complete set of estimates for different agricultural products can be found in IR·6 
Information Report No. 90-1, "Economic Evaluation of Agricultural Research," May 
1990. Report drafted by the subcommittee of the Technical Committee of Interregional 
Hatch Project 6 (IR-6). 
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indicators of the structural economic characteristics of agriculture. Given 
declining prices and the structure of demand described above, a low supply 
elasticity implies a low opportunity cost for fixed assets (fixed-resource assets) 
and a high cost of resource adjustment. Hence, the elasticity provides key 
information to determine. the ability of production resources to adjust , as well as 
the expected relative cost of the adjustment. 
Supply and input demand elasticities are derived from an optimization 
problem. The central element of that problem is the existence of a well behaved 
production function, or its dual, the cost function. Therefore, supply and input 
demand elasticities depend upon the characteristics and dynamics of the 
production function (cost function) which is the basic expression of the prevalent 
technology. As technologies are adopted by producers, the production function 
changes. Therefore, the supply and input demand elasticities also are likely to 
change. The continuous input substitution induced by the implementation of 
new techniques changes the degree of resource use response to market 
events. A new input mix represents a different degree of qualitative and 
quantitative resource adjustment. 
As supply elasticities change due to technology innovation and other 
variables, the relative performance of a specific policy will also change. Under 
Rausser's (1982) Policy Preference Function framework, varying elasticity 
estimates will imply that the relative policy weight of the different interest or 
social groups will also change. Therefore, a time path describing the evolution 
of government policy preferences might be derived and used to improve the 
explanatory power of the model. 
Depending on agriculture's supply and demand structure, consumers 
may receive a larger share of the benefits from research and technological 
change than producers. Another distributive consequence of technical change 
is that as production and productivity increase, the need for agricultural 
resource adjustment also increases. Farmers claims for government 
compensation depend on the structure of agricultural production and 
consumption. The social cost of farmers income-support programs need to be 
compared with the social benefits of research expenditures. This comparison 
would provide a consistent measure ofthe overall welfare impact of these 
agricultural policies. 
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Archibald's (1988) work incorporates externalities into the evaluation of 
productivity gains. Research activities and technological change create some 
externalities, including soil erosion, increases in soil salinity, diminished pests 
vulnerability to pesticides, and underground water contamination due to 
fertilizers use. Therefore, these byproducts of technological adoption also are 
social costs to research. Although the existence and importance of externalities 
are recognized, the present research has not dealt with it. This research is 
focused on the relationship between income support programs, public research 
policy and technology adoption. 
Problem Statement 
Agricultural support programs and research policy could be considered 
as two faces of the same policy. Synthesizing support and research policies in 
turn would allow integrating the analysis of two related issues. The first issue 
deals with the farm problem, as defined by T.W. Schultz (1953) and reflects the 
existence of what Cochrane (1958) called the myth of a self-adjusting or easy-
adjusting agriculture. The second refers to the level of consumers' agricultural 
food prices. 
Some economists consider government intervention to be the cause of 
the farm problem because it does not allow for agricultural markets to clear. 
They argue that removing all government intervention would result in the farm 
problem's automatic elimination. Among other thingss, this position does not 
assign the government any role in agriculture's technological development. 
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It is a popular belief that agricultural prices would be lower if agricultural 
price and income support policies were removed. In fact, the last one hundred 
years has seen a trend of diminishing consumer prices, which only altered 
during short periods of time. This trend has been feasible, in part, due to the 
adoption of new farm technology, which at large has benefited consumers. One 
view is that to make PERT policy feasible, society must compensate producers 
by easing the adjustment process while still adopting the new technologies. 
Moreover, in the absence of the compensating policies it could be argued that 
adoption may have been slower, and consequently consumers would not have 
benefited as much as they have. 
To tackle the problem described above in a more consistent way, new 
supply and input demand elasticity estimates are necessary. Available 
producer-response parameters generally have been estimated without taking 
into account the synergism between government support policies and 
technological change. Therefore new estimates should incorporate the impact 
of technological change into the estimation process and thus link farm 
programs, public research policy, and technical change. 
Research Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to estimate producers-response 
3 For a complete discussion of this issue, the reader is referred to the second chapter in 
Cochrane(1958). 
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parameters from a framework which encompasses the role of public policies 
such as farm programs and public research in the technology adoption process. 
The stydy•s specific objectives are: 
1. Assess the relative size of the net benefits to agriculture, and their 
distribution among farm and non-farm groups, from the policies described 
previously. 
2. To develop supply elasticity functions useful to describe the changes in 
the elasticity parameters across time, due to the adoption of new technology. 
3. To determine the characteristics of the interaction between farm 
programs and public research policy in fostering technical change. 
4. To estimate an aggregate government Policy Preference Function for 
the agricultural sector. 
Research Hypotheses 
Achieving this dissertation objectives will test the following hypotheses: 
1. Government policies have compensated producers in order to adopt 
new technologies, from which consumers have benefited. 
2. Producer-support programs have stimulated technology adoption 
during periods of low farm income. 
3. Technology adoption is positively related to export demand expansion. 
4. Consumer agricultural prices would be higher in the absence of 
government intervention. 
Some of the above hypotheses will be tested directly from the estimated 
coefficients in the econometric model. Others will be tested based on 
judgments made from results obtained on secondary estimations and/or 
calculations. Finally, some hypotheses will be tested on informal judgments 
based on trends of predicted or computed variables. 
Organization of Study 
This chapter introduced the dissertation•s subject matter. Chapter II 
examines key concepts in policy analysis and technological change and 
reviews selected studies. Topics reviewed are applied welfare economics, 
endogenous technical change, and the economics of technical change. 
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The methodological foundations of the empirical model used are 
discussed in Chapter Ill. Chapter IV contains the specification of the empirical 
model and its empirical characteristics, the specification of the model variables, 
and their correspondent data sources. Chapter IV also discusses the 
identification of each model equation and the estimation procedure. 
Chapter V examines the output of the estimation process and its statistical 
validation, as well as the derivation of the relevant producers• response 
parameters. The production-response parameters presented in Chapter V, will 
be used to estimate an aggregate policy preference function for the U.S. 
agricultural sector in Chapter VI. The dissertation ends with Chapter VII, which 
contains a summary of the study, its conclusions, and topics for further research. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETI'CAL BACKGROUND AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The objective of this chapter is to present previous research and 
theoretical considerations on three major issues. The first issues is the use of 
applied welfare economics as a valid tool for policy analysis. A review of some 
relevant studies, their weaknesses and strengths, and recent developments 
regarding policy analysis will be discussed. The second major topic deals with 
the recent literature of simultaneous analysis of public research and farm 
programs. The most relevant research is evaluated in terms of its findings and 
shortcomings. Finally, this chapter looks at two key issues in the economics of 
technical change: the technology-generating process, and the adoption of new 
technology. 
Welfare Economics and· Agricultural Policy 
Economists have made welfare economics their primary tool for policy 
analysis. Operationally, welfare analysis provides economists with an indicator 
of economic effects of alternative decisions. Applied welfare economics can 
guide policy-makers in evaluating actual policies in real markets, using 
available data and reasonable methods (Hallam,1988). 
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The agricultural policy analysis literature is rich in welfare studies on a 
variety of policy issues. Specifically, regarding welfare applications to farm 
programs, there is the work of T.D. Wallace (1962), in which he estimates the 
social cost of three characteristic and alternative farm policies; Cochrane's 
production quotas; Brannan price subsidies; and an input restriction to reduce 
agricultural output. Tweeten (1987) and Gardner (1987a) provide an analytical 
scheme to evaluate the welfare consequences of farm programs. Following the 
work of Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983) regarding interest groups political 
influence, Gardner (1983, 1987b) studied the efficiency of commodity programs 
as an income transfer mechanism. 
Applied welfare economics concepts also have been used widely to 
measure benefits from research and compute the rates of return to research 
investments. Examples of these are the pioneer work of Griliches (1958) 
dealing with hybrid corn; Peterson's (1967) study on the poultry industry; 
Schmitz and Seckler's (1970) analysis of the tomato harvester; and Freebairn, 
Davis, and Edwards' (1982) study on the distribution of research benefits. The 
common denominator of these studies is their use of economic surplus to 
measure the benefits due to the adoption of new technology. These measures 
of economic surplus were constructed using either previous estimates or 
arbitrary values of the elasticity parameters. 
As summarized by Just (1988), applied welfare economics faces three 
major obstacles. First, the failure of competitive equilibrium to achieve Pareto 
efficiency, especially in the case of incomplete risk markets and imperfect 
information. The second obstacle is the inability to make interpersonal 
comparisons, and the third, the separation of efficiency (economic) and equity 
(political) decisions. 
Hart (1975) found that under the presence of incomplete markets, the 
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usual continuity and convexity assumptions do not ensure the existence of an 
equilibrium. Moreover, if an equilibrium does exist it will not be fully Pareto 
optimal and consequently, applied welfare economics analysis would produce 
misleading results. However; Hallam (1988) argues that theoretical models can 
take care of stylized policies and market arrangements; therefore, the limitation 
of welfare economics is basically a problem' of using imperfect but rigorous 
theory and implementable empirical methods. Innes and Rausser (1989) and 
Innes (1990) evaluated the same policies as Wallace (1962) ~ut_considered a 
stochastic production, economy with incomplete markets in agriculture. These 
studies concluded that 'distributional and welfare implications might be reversed 
from competitive equilibrium. 
Agriculture is characterized as an stochastic production economy; and 
contrary to the pure exchange case, no general theory of production behavior 
for the case when markets are incomplete has been developed (Hart, 1975). 
Therefore, economic theory limitations constrain the ability of applied welfare 
economics to deal with agriculture's problems. 
Diamond's (1980) study on the efficiency implications of uncertain supply 
provides some interesting results applicable to agriculture. Based on a 
production uncertainty framework, he found that where producers are risk 
averse and demand elasticity is different from one, suppliers do not maximize 
expected prqfits; instead, for any given price, they produce more in the low 
income state than they would if they were risk neutral. Whether they produce 
more relative to risk neutrality in the high or low output state depends on the 
elasticity of demand. In fact, an inelastic demand implies a higher production 
relative to risk neutrality in low output states. Diamond's results seems to 
reinforce the inelasticity of agricultural supply for low-income states, e.g. when 
downward production adjustments are needed. 
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When providing information for policy-makers, Buccola (1988) argues that 
is not possible to avoid judgements about interpersonal utility correspondences 
or desirable tradeoffs. Furthermore, economics lacks the objective means of 
making interpersonal comparisons (Just, 1988). Therefore, in the absence of 
objective support for change,· the ability of applied welfare economics to provide 
policy prescriptions is limited. 
An important contribution of the public choice literature is to emphasize 
the fact that economists do not need to worry about making interpersonal 
comparisons. That is the responsibility of the actual decision makers. 
Rausser's (1982) policy framework, described earlier, is based on three 
premises: a) political and economic markets are not separable; b) pure transfers 
do not exist; and c) this is a second best world. This framework is an indirect 
charge to policy analysts to expand their concerns beyond the concept of 
paretian efficiency. 
Public choice emphasizes a positive role for economists in the policy 
decision process, contrary to the normative character of welfare economics. 
Buchanan (1988) strongly argues that the only positive role of economists is to 
diagnose social situations and present the choosing individuals a set of feasible 
changes. The policy proposed is then subject to a conceptual test, which takes 
the form of consensus. If a consensus towards the implementation of a policy is 
achieved, then a Pareto efficiency situation has been reached. The measure of 
••wellness .. in this context, is not an improvement in an independently 
observable characteristic but rather on agreement among decision-makers. 
The economist's task is completed when he/she has shown the parties 
concerned the existence of gains from trade. The economist has no function in 
suggesting contract terms in the bargaining range itself (Buchanan, 1989). 
Despite the abundant policy analysis research based on applied welfare 
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economics and the policy advice derived from it, policy-makers continue to 
implement policies which apparently are contrary to welfare economics 
principles (Just, 1988). One explanation is that policy-makers tend to focus on 
broader issues than economists do (Ray and Plaxico,1988). On this issue, 
Little (1957) states there is no part of well-being called economic well-being. 
The term economic qualifies the causes of well-being, therefore economic 
welfare concerns are limited to the economic basis of welfare, in other words, to 
the economic efficiency of alternative policies. The politicians' objective 
function emphasizes social and political issues, such as income distribution. 
The estimation of the distributional impacts of government policies, in and out of 
agriculture, within the farm sector, and between rich and poor farmers, is a 
challenge for welfare economics (Sigman, Newbery, and Zilberman, 1988). 
Applied welfare economics is far from a trouble free approach. Despite its 
limitations, it continues to be the best available tool for policy analysis (Currie 
et.al.,1971; Harberger,1971; Sigman et.al.,1988; Hallam,1988). 
Agricultural Research and Other Market Intervention Policies 
There are three groups of studies which have set the foundations for the 
simultaneous analysis of public research and government income support 
programs in agriculture. These are, first, the studies by Gardner (1987; 1988); 
second, the work of Alston, Edwards and Freebairn (1988); and finally, the 
research by Oehmke (1988), Oehmke and Yao (1990), and Oehmke and Chan 
Choe (1991 ). Although all three groups of studies are generally concerned with 
the appropriate determination of research benefits under government market 
intervention, it can be argued that the same methodologies can be applied for 
the simultaneous evaluation of public research and government support 
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programs. This section will present the main features and conclusions of those 
studies as they relate to the objectives of this research. 
Alston. Edwards. and Freebairn (1988) 
Alston, Edwards, and Freebairn (1988) evaluated research benefits under 
government intervention as if public research was not a form of market 
intervention. From the several scenarios in Alston et. al, two are the most 
relevant for our purpose: the analysis of target prices with deficiency payments 
for nontraded goods, and the analysis of production subsidies for an export 
good. Alston's et. al study assumes that research causes a downward shift in 
the supply curve, and investment in research is exogenous, therefore 
independent of market distortions. 
Let's look first to the case of target prices with deficiency payments for a 
nontraded good. In figure 1, D represents the domestic demand and S the 
supply of a nontraded good. On the price axis, Pr is a government fixed target 
price which is supported by deficiency payments. The effect of research 
(technology) is to shiftS to S'. With no government intervention, benefits of 
research are given by abed, which is the area beneath the demand curve and 
between the supply curves. With the introduction of the target price, Pr, 
producers' and consumers' benefits increase due to a higher quantity produced 
and a lower price. The amount of government payments increase due to the 
outward shift in the supply curve caused by the implementation of a successful 
public research program, from area P.,-jef to area P.,ghi. 
Net benefits to research due to target price program are measured by 
subtracting the increase in government cost from the sum of benefits to 
Price s s· 
0 Quantity 
Source: Alston, Julian M., Geoff W. Edwards, and John W. Freebaim. 1988. "Market 
Distortions And Benefits From Research." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 70:281-288. 
Figure 1. Effects of a Target P·rice/Defficiency Payment Scheme 




producers and consumers. Research benefits decrease by the absolute value 
of the difference between area bje and area cgh , which are the social cost 
without research and with research respectively. Alston et al. conclude that this 
' 
policy changes the distribution of research benefits and only affects net 
research benefits to the extent that the shift in supply changes the cost of the 
policy. 
Figure 2 represents a production subsidy in an export product. In the 
same study, Alston et al., assumed that supply and demand curves are linear, 
and that shifts in the supply curve due to the producer's subsidy and research 
are parallel. Starting from a free-trade setting, the supply is given by S, 
domestic demand by Dd and total demand by D; P and Q are initial price and 
quantity. The supply curve shifts by R to S' due to research, the price falls to P' 
and the quantity rises to Q'. The effects are: domestic consumers surplus 
increases by area PabP' ; domestic producers gains are equal to the sum of 
areas mcfn and edf minus PeeP'; foreign consumers gain area acdb; the net 
world effect is a gain of area mcdn . 
The government sets a production subsidy ofG per unit. Then, by 
assumption, the supply shifts 'from S to 8 5 without research and from S' to 8'5 
with research. In this case domestic consumers' surplus gains due to research 
area P5ghP'5 ; domestic producers gains are given by area rjts plus ukt minus 
PsiuP's. Foreign consumers gain area gjhk. The gains for all, consumers and 
producers, are greater now than in the absence of the subsidy because the 
subsidy has generated a lower market price, and a larger quantity. On the other 
hand, the research-induced expansion of output increases government outlays 
by G(Q' 5 - Q5), which represents the subsidy per unit times the increase in 
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Source: Alston, Julian M., Geoff W. Edwards, and John W. Freebairn. 1988. "Market 
Distortions And Benefits From Research. • American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 70:281-288. 
Figure 2. Effects of a Production Subsidy on Research Benefits 
in an Open Economy with Linear Curves 




to research are equal to the extra government subsidy payment4. 
Therefore, for the case above the net world social cost is not affected by 
the subsidy. In fact, the excess production cost triangle under the production 
subsidy is the same without research (cxj) as with research (dyk). However, 
net domestic research benefits are lower with the subsidy because the increase 
in the government outlays is greater than the additional domestic gains; and it is 
equal to the increase in benefits in the rest of the world (area gjkh minus area 
acdb ). 
The study concludes that market intervention reduces benefits from 
research. However, the results are in part dependent on the linearity and 
parallel shifting assumptions. Moreover, the approach used in the study implies 
that market intervention has no impact on research effects, or government policy 
has no influence on technology adoption. 
Gardner's 1987 and 1988 Studies 
Gardner's research introduced the political analysis of government 
intervention into agricultural economics. In his 1987 study he looked at farm 
programs as efficient measures for income redistribution (Gardner,1987). In a 
later study he introduced the idea that research spending and market 
intervention must be analyzed simultaneously in a public choice contexts. The 
basic idea in that paper is that price or income support programs, although 
sometimes inefficient means are necessary. They are necessary to increase 
social economic welfare when research by itself is politically infeasible, as in 
4 This is a simple consequence of the assumptions of linearity and parallel shift. For a formal 
presentation see footnote 5 in Alston, Edwards, and Freebaim (1988). 
5 Gardner, Bruce. "Price Supports and Optimal Agricultural Research." Working Paper #88-1. 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland. January, 1988. 
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the case where research yields gains for consumers at producers' expense. 
Let's follow Gardner's example of two interest groups: consumer-
taxpayers and producers. For the first group, the benefits generated by research 
and price supports are higher consumer surplus• and lower government 
budgetary costs represented by Bcr ; the benefits for the second group, 
producers, is given by Bp which represents the lev~l of producers' surplus. 
' 
Social Welfare, W,, is the algebraic sum of Bcr andBp, and it is represented by: 
W= Bcr+Bp , (2.1) 
In figure 3, the no-: intervention (no public, research, no market intervention) 
situation generates a reference level of benefits, E, over the line Wo. 
Appropriately measured, research would be beneficial if the sum of Bcr and Bp 
increases, or if a new point at the northeast of E is achieved. The dotted lines 
intersecting in E show the current welfare level of each group. Points below EX 
imply relative losses for producers, while points above EX indicate gains. 
Similarly, points at the left of EY indicate lower surplus for consumers, while 
' ' 
points to the right imply a larger syrplus. 
If research spending yields a·point ~::~.over W1 > W0 ; it implies gains for . 
consumers but losses for producers. Political pressures might not allow this to 
h~ppen. If income or price supports simultaneously are introduced, then point 
~ ' ' ~ 
E* can be reached,'and I E* > E'. Mo~eover both groups are bette-r off in E* than 
in E, so there will be gains for the move and it also will be a feasible situatio~. 
However, E* is inside the constant-sum-if surplus-line W1, therefore it implies 
deadweight losses, which come from the inefficiencies of the income or price 
support program. 
Source: Gardner, Bruce. 1988. "Price Supports and Optimal Agricultural 
Research." Working Paper #88-1. Department of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics. University of Maryland. 
Figure 3. Distributional Effects of Technological Change 
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Three political settings are compared. The first case implies equal 
weights across states for consumers and producers surpluses. The second 
assumes equal weights at the no-research state, but weights the heaviest the 
one who looses in the research state; in this way it will generate compensating 
policies. The third case weights producers surpluses the heaviest across 
states. The first case is used as a reference to .compare results of the other two. 
Case two is the most likely to occur, and its implications are described below. 
The above is consistent ~ith the following representation of the social 
welfare function: 
w = BeT+ qBp , q > o (2.2) 
where q represents the weight of producers benefits relative to consumers and 
taxpayers benefits. 
Gardner found that for the cases in which the effect of research is a 
reduction in producers' surplus, research adoption is likely to be retarded; 
although price support programs partially offset this effect. The above occurs if 
producers' surplus is weighted heavier than or equal to consumers• at the no-
research state, but heavier at the research state. Regarding support programs, 
Gardner's findings show that, the closer they are to lump-sum transfers, the 
likely they are to take research spending closer to the optimal. Furthermore, the 
less elastic is the supply, the redistributing efficiency of price support is greater. 
Consequently price supports are more conducive to research if the supply is 
inelastic. 
Regarding to the impact of the supply function shift on research benefits, 
the paper by Lindner and Jarrett (1978) explains that the benefits from research 
depend upon the kind of shift of the supply function. This dependence becomes 
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evident in figure 4, where benefits from research are represented by the area to 
the left of the infinitely inelastic demand, and between the original supply curve 
8 and the set of research influenced supply curves are represented by 8'1, 8'2, 
8'3 and 8'4. Clearly, the size of research benefits is determined not only by the 
size of the shift but also by the kind of shift, whether parallel, convergent, 
divergent, etc. 
Gardner's (1988) study calls attention to the fact that for agricultural policy 
analysis, agricultural supply response to price is expected to be inelastic, and 
that the quantity supplied is expected to fall to zero before the price falls to zero. 
That is, production ceases when variable costs exceed revenues. For the 
analysis of support programs the lack of the second characteristic can be solved 
safely by a linear local approximation. However, when evaluating research 
benefits, the problem that arises is the same described earlier by Lindner and 
Jarrett. Notice that in figure 4, the size of research benefits is greatly influenced 
by the change in the minimum price required to acquire the good produced, 
which is what Gardner calls the "choke price", or plainly the intercept on the 
price axis. 
The "choke price" can be used as an indicator of the inframarginal effects 
of technological change in costs. In cases where the number of firms which 
adopt a technical innovation is larger and the more homogeneous firms are, 
the "choke price" will shift the most. For this case, the shift in the supply will 
approach a parallel shift. 
Oehmke's studies 
Oehmke (1988) shows if the effects of government market 





Source: Lindner, R.K. and F.G. Jarrett. 1978. "Supply Shifts and the Size of Research 
Benefits." American Journal of Agrjcuttural Economics. 60:48-58. 
Figure 4. Type of Supply Shift and Research Benefits 
rates of return (RORs) to research will be affected significantly. The RORs 
undertaken in period t=O is defined to be r=1/B -1, where B solves: 
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f~t(dPSt + ()CSt _ dGt) = O 
t=O dRo dRo dRo 
(2.3) 
where, PS is producers' surplus, CS is consumers' surplus, G is government 
expenditures, R is research expenditures, and t is the time parameter. 
Equation {2.3) underlines the sensitivity of RORs to the empirical 
specification of the supply and demand equations. If one of these functions is 
misspecified then RORs for research will be biased. Also from the same 
equation, notice the sensitivity of RORs to the definition of the government costs. 
Are government outlays due to market intervention a part of research cost? 
Successful research will induce an outward shift on the supply function. Under 
existing government market intervention, the cost of intervention for taxpayers 
will increase, even to the point where social benefits after research are 
negative. 
This dissertation addresses the estimation of a supply function consistent 
with the interaction of public research programs and government income-
support programs. By considering both type of policies as part of a single policy 
issue, this dissertation looks to address the issues described in the above 
paragraph. 
What are the effects of market distortions on RORs? Oehmke provides the 
answer considering a special case of (2.3). First, assume that research is the 
only exogenous change in the model; it occurs only at time t=O and has an 
immediate response. These assumptions imply that dPSt/dRo=dPSsfdRo for s, 
t~o. similarly for the consumers' surplus term. The following also holds true, 
dGofdRo=dGt/dRo+ 1, for t;:::1. Then (2.3) becomes: 
when 181<1, the second bracketed expression, equals 1/(1-B). By 





From (2.5) it is apparent that r is decreasing in dG/dR0 , which implies that 
if research costs increase, ceteris paribus, then ROR to research falls. Now 
consider that if research induces the supply to shift outward, then the 
government cost of market intervention will increase. If the cost increase of 
market intervention is attributed to research, then dG/dR0 increases relatively in 
a situation where only direct costs of research are considered. Therefore, 
accounting for the increase in the government cost of market intervention lowers 
the ROR of research and consequently, the traditional RORs reported in the 
literature are biased upwards. 
6 The interpretation of dG/dRo is independent of the assumptions used to derive (3). Oehmke 
(1988). pp.293-294. 
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The key of Oehmke's analysis is the interpretation of dG/dR0 . If dG/dR0 is 
underestimated, then the RO~ will be overestimated. The increases in the cost 
due to the research-induced supply shift should be included as part of the 
research program's total cost in order to attempt the estimation of the true ROR. 
Oehmke's study addresses the issue of interaction between public 
research programs and market intervention in 'the determination of the true cost 
' . ' 
of research. ' However, the study does not directly allow for the possibility that 
existing forms· .of governm·ent market intervention might play a role in the 
research prograr11's success i.e., adoption of the new technology. 
A different perspective is taken in a study by Oehmke and Yao (1990). As 
in Gardner's 1987 study, they base their work on the theory of interest groups 
and considered the joint analysis of public research spending and farm 
programs as part of the same political issue. Their objective was to estimate a 
policy preference function consistent with the government policy choices in the 
wheat sector. They found that government places an 80% premium on wheat 
producers' surplus relative to consumers'; and consumers• surplus is valued at 
50% of the value of budget savings. These weights were found to be consistent 
with actual levels of government support and public research expenditures. 
The study also supports the view that, government provides funding for 
research mainly because increases consumers' economic welfare. These funds 
are limited by the costs of producers• support programs: 
Oehmke and Chan Choe (1991) follow on the previous Oehmke and Yao 
(1990) research. One purpose of this study is to estimate the parameters of a 
government objective function to determine if agricultural policies, target price, 
and public research can be explained as the result of a bargaining process 
among producers, taxpayers and consumers. A second objective and major 
contribution of this paper is to relate the relative importance of each group in the 
goverment policy preference function, to the political environment and the 
characteristics of these groups. 
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To accomplish the second task, Oehmke and Chan Choe assumed that 
the relative weights of each group in the government•s policy preference 
function are random variables generated by the political process. Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) and regression methods were used to test if in fact the policy 
weights of each group are likely to be drawn from the same distribution. The 
research tested for cross-crop, trend, and election year changes in the 
estimated weights. Tests results were related to each group•s characteristics. 
The empirical evidence found did not provide strong support that changes on 
relative weights occur under the three above-mentioned hypotheses. 
For a consistent utilization of applied welfare economics in the analysis of 
public research and farm programs, a policy analyst should estimate output 
supply and input demand functions incorporating the impacts of agricultural 
policy. Production parameters need to be related to policy variables. The 
estimation approach should account for policy variables induced market 
equilibrium changes through their impact of market equilibrium conditions; and 
policy variables induced changes in production structure through changes in 
available technology and in patterns of innovation. 
Endogenous Technical Change 
According to Chambers (1988), specific advantages, such as analytical 
and econometric tractability, and the fact that technical change occurs over time 
have motivated the widespread use of a time term in the production function as 
a measure of technical change. This measure obviously is a passive approach 
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which attempts to quantify technical change without explaining it. This approach 
tends to perpetuate the naive assumptions that (a) producers are unable to 
compute optimal solutions even when they know the true functional 
specification of nonstochastic production technologies, and (b) changes in 
aggregate technology remain invariant to changes in exogenous economic 
variables 7 
Alternative approaches are Hick's (1963) induced innovation hypothesis 
and the work of Mundalk and others on endogenous technical change. Hicks 
premise is that technological change is a response to changes in relative factor 
prices. Most of the empirical studies on the induced innovation hypothesis do 
not specify factor prices as determinants of factor biases. Instead factor bias 
measures are calculated on the basis of time trends; these measures are 
compared then with movements in factor prices to test for induced innovation 
(Frisvold, 1991). Frisvold (1991) defines a model, in which the process of 
technical change is endogenous, to specifically test for the induced innovation 
hypothesis. In Frisvold's study, the factor bias is defined as a function of the 
government's objective function, the total research budget, current prices, and a 
time trend. 
Recent work within the endogenous technical change framework has 
attempted to develop a conceptual base which could simultaneously relate the 
technology adoption process to production decisions and vice versa 
(Mundlak,1988;1988a;1984). Another set of studies has advanced the 
statistical methods to endogenize technical change: Bassman, Hayes, Slottje, 
and Molina, 1987; Mundlak, 1988; Swamy, Lupo, and Sneed, 1989; Fawson, 
Shumway, and Bassman, 1990. There is a third group of research which has 
applied this framework to specific policy analysis cases: Mundlak and 
7 Fawson, Shumway, and Bassman {1990), pp. 182. -
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Hellinghausen, 1982 (a multicountry case study); Cavallo and Mundlak, 1982 
(Argentina); Coeymans and Mundlak, 1987 (Chile); Mundlak, Cavallo, and 
Domenech, 1989 (Argentina); McGuirk and Mundlak, 1991 (Punjab)B. Most of 
the empirical work dealing with endogenous technology has used some type of 
Cobb-Douglas functional form. 
The basic idea of the endogenous technical change approach is the need 
to account for systematic and random variations of the economic parameters 
when analyzing and estimating production and cost functions and technical 
relationships. The existence of these variations-- technical state of the art, 
factor prices, weather, and others -- are known to producers and, to a certain 
extent, endogenous to the economic maximization process of producers. 
Consequently, these variations influence producers' production and cost 
functions. 
Marschak and Andrews (1944) were the first to introduce the notion of 
production coefficients depending on the technical knowledge, the will, effort, 
and luck of a given entrepreneur in a given year, as can be summarized in the 
concept 'techni~al efficiency'. 9 This notion led Marschak and Andrews to 
develop an alternative empirical model for the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, consistent with random production coefficients. In their model the 
parameters a1 and a2. elasticities of output with respect to inputs X1 and X2. 
are assumed to be time and firm-to-firm invariant; only the coefficient Ao is 
regarded as dependent on technical efficiency. The alternative production 
function model is summarized by: 
8 At the time this research was developed, the only application to the U.S. agriculture was 
provided by Fawson, Shumway, and Bassman (1990); and Fawson and Shumway (1991); both 
studies look to provide support for the endogenous technology framework. Neither can be 
regarded as a policy application. 
9 Marshak and Andrews (1944), pp. 145 and 156. 
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(2.6) 
where Yo. X1 and X2 stand for the natural log of the physical quantities of output 
and any two inputs, respectively. The subscriptf indicates a particular firm and 
year. The parameters a1 anda2 also were assumed fixed only due to 
limitations on the statistical tools available1o. · , 
' ' 
Later, Mundlak and Hoch (1965) and Zelln~r, Kmenta and Dreze (1966) 
argue that in .estimating. parameters of. a stochastic _C~bb-Douglas production 
~ • i ~ 
function, statistical methods are very sensitive to the specification of the 
behavior of the disturbance term. The specification of the disturbance is directly 
associated with two key assumptions; (i) a non-deterministic production 
function, and (ii) producers have full knowledge of the stochastic character of 
the production function1-1. The traditiol)ai_Cobb-Douglas approach is based on 
a deterministic, profit-maximizing behavior. 
The endogeneity of technology in the two studies above is associated 
with the transmission of the disturbances of the production function to inputs. 
This transmission implies that the independent variables and the disturbances 
are not independent. This depende_ncy raises the issue of simultaneity, and 
therefore of endogeneity in the proquction parameters. 
The most comprehensive endogenous technology conceptual framework 
' ' ' 
was developed by Mundlak (19BB),12:The starting point is the differentiation 
between technology (T) and implemented technology (IT). Technology is 
' ' 
defined as the collection of possible techniques, described as: 
10 Marschak ans Andrews (1944), pp.159-160. 
11 These assumptions belong to the Zellner et. al study. However can also be incorporated to the 
Mundlak and Hoch research. 
12 The discussion of Mundlak's endogenous technology approach is based on Mundlak (198Ba; 
1988b) and McGurik and Mundlak (1981) · 
T = {Fj(X)} 
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(2.7) 
where Fj(X) is the production function associated with the jth technique. A 
production function is a microeconomic concept which describes a specific 
technique. Under the regular assumptions, a production function is associated 
with a convex input requirement set. Therefore, T defines a convex input 
requirement ·defined by the input requirement set of the individual techniques. 
Within this framework, technical change is defined as a change in T. 
Implemented technology is defined as the set of all techniques actually 
implemented. Thi.s definition implies the existence of constraints which limit the 
input requirement set ofT, in a manner in which IT is defined as a subset ofT. 
These concepts are illustrated in figure 5. 
Assuming one output (Y) and two inputs in agriculture, capital (K) and 
labor (L), technology is the collection of two techniques Y 1 and Y 2. and its input 
requirement is bounded from below by its isoquant. In figure 5, w0 is the slope 
of the isocost line tangent to Y 1 and Y 2. the unit isoquants of the two 
technologies. Let k be the actual capital-labor ratio, and k1 and k2 the threshold 
capital-labor ratios corresponding to.w0 . For k~k2, the capital-intensive 
technique is used exclusively and the isoquant associated with T is identical 
with Y 2=1. For kSk1, only the labor intensive-technique is used and the relevant 
isoquant is the same as Y1=1. Finally, for k1Sk~k2, both techniques are used, 
and the input requirement set is bounded by the segment MN over the isocost 
line. The difference between the convex input requirement set of T and IT is 
then apparent, and it also is apparent that more than both techniques can 
coexist. 
If, as shown in figure 5, several (at least two) techniques can coexist, then 






1/w Labor (L) 
Source: Mundlak, Yair. 1988. "Capital Accumulation, The Choice Of Techniques, 
and Agricultural Output." In Agricultural Price Policy for Developing 
Countries. Edited by John W. Mellor and Raisuddin Ahmed. The John 
Hopkins University Press. , 
Figure 5. Choice of Technique 
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the existence of more than technique. Also, from the above discussion it is clear 
that the estimated production function will depend on the distribution of prices 
and resource constraints existing before and after the introduction of a new 
technique, therefore the identification of the constraining factor becomes key in 
obtaining a full description of the production process. 
The choice of technique is made at the firm level. The corresponding 
optimization problem considers the maximization of the lagrangian: 
(2.8) 
such that FiO belongs to the set of available technology (T); v and bare variable 
and fixed inputs respectively; E represents the relevant characteristics of the 
economic environment in which technique i is implemented; Pi is the price of the 
product of technique i; w is the vector of factor prices; and b is the constraint on 
~b· £.. I. 
The Khun-Tucker necessary conditions for a solution are: 








ALA.= 0 (2.14) 
where Lbi. Lvi. Fvi. Fbi, and LA. are vectors of the first partial derivatives. 
The solution··can be described as: 
The problem's exogenous variables are represented by s. A most 
important task in this framework is the appropriate identification of the factors 
constraining the adoptiqn of the implemented techniques (b). Notice that (b) not 
only represents constraints, but it also represents factors which might favorably 
induce rather than retard 'technology adoption. The set of "positive" and 
'~negative" constraints will be referred as the state variables (s): 
S=(b,p,w,E,T) (2.15) 
. The choice of techniques and the level of their use is determined jointly. 
' ', 
The number of techniques depend on a finite number of constraints (b). 
Available technology (T), environment (E), constraints (b), and the product and 
variable inputs prices determine the techniques to be used. Meanwhile, their 
. level of use is determined by the optimal allocation of variable inputs (v*i) and 
fixed inputs (b*i)- Consequently equations (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11) can be 
rearrange a,s follow: 
37 
(2.16)' 
If equation {2.9) or equation (2.10) is negative, the marginal cost is greater 
than the value of the marginal product and then v*i =0 or correspondingly b*i=O. 
The optimal output of technique i is y*i=Fi(v\b\E). As presented earlier, 
the implemented technology (IT) is the set of all implemented techniques, and is 
a subset ofT. 
The implemented technology, IT, can be described by: 
Given the usual regularity conditions for Fi and for any set of state 
variables, equation (2. 17) describes a well-behaved technology. 
Consequently, a profit function can be derived: 
(2.17) 
(2.18) 
The various theorems dealing with the duality between profit and 
production functions hold true though conditional on s. The frontier of IT(s) is 
dual to 1t(s) and vice versa13. By Hotelling's lemma, factor demand at the 
technique level, v*i(S) is given by: 
(2.19) 
13 It is important to note that the exploitation of this property in empirical analysis is limited by the 
fact that s varies over the sample. Thus, strictly speaking, each point in the sample comes from a 
different profit function, which in tum describes a different set of implemented technology. 
The aggregate input demands is given by v*(s)=LV*i(S). Similarly the 
supply of output of technique i is given by: 
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(2.20) 
If there is more than technique producing a given crop, then 
(2.21) 
where y*ijiS the ith technique used to produce the jth crop and y*j is the total 
output of crop j. Finally, the aggregate value of supply is given by: 
(2.22) 
A most important feature of this approach is that a change in a state 
variable brings about two joint and simultaneous effects. The first may lead to 
variations in the optimal combinations of inputs along a given production 
function. Next, it causes F(x*,s) to vary. For example, changes in prices 
generate not only variations in inputs and outputs, but a different set of 
implemented functions too. 
Economics of Technical Change in Agriculture 
There are three aspects on the economics of technical change which are 
of special interest to this research: 
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1. The process of generating new technologies. 
2. The rationality of the adoption of new technologies by farmers. 
3. The influence of public policy in technology adoption. 
Most of the economic literature looks at the innovation process as a 
private, profit seeking enterprise.< The theory of "induced innovation'', which 
has been developed as a theory of the firm, argues that firms will generate 
innovations driven by the economy's resource endowment, the relative price of 
factors, changes in product demand, and the firm's research productivity and 
research costs (Binswanger,1974; Ruttan and Hayami,1988). Griliches (1957, 
1979) argued that the decision of the technology-p'roducing firm is influenced 
by the market size, marketing cost, the research and development cost, the 
expected rate of acceptance of the innovation, and the overall performance on 
the "consumer" industry. An additional element driving firm-level inventive 
activity is the degree to which inventing firms can enjoy the expected benefits 
from the innovation (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984). However, according to 
Bosworth and Westaway {1984), although high profits increase the incentive to 
innovate, they also can restrict and/or delay the availability of new technology 
until profits from existing technologies disappear or become relatively small. 
Despite the ample literature regarding the contribution of public research 
to agricultural output and its high rates of returns (Griliches, 1958; 
Evenson, 1967; Peterson, 1967,1971; Cline, 1975; Evenson, Waggoner and 
Ruttan, 1979; Knutson ar)d Tweeten, 1979) little attention has been given to the 
determinants of the demand for public research. Guttman (1978) considered 
public agricultural research as an imperfect puplic good and used a model of 
political interest groups to explain state allocations to agricultural research in 
the United States. This model viewed farmers and producers of agricultural 
inputs as the demanders of agricultural <research. He hypothesized that demand 
40 
of agricultural research is a function of farmer education, the research level in 
bordering states, farmer sales levels, full or partial ownership of land, the 
number of farmers producing other commodities, the size of industry producing 
agro-chemical inputs, farm cooperative membership, and the overall state 
budget. 
Huffman and Miranowski (1981 ), developed a model of resource 
allocation for state-produced research at agricultural experiment stations. This 
model included supply and demand equations for research, an equation for 
allocating state revenues to station research, and an equilibrium equation in the 
form of expenditure identity. To emphasize the effects of local environmental 
factors, and the limitations of borrowed research, Huffman and Miranowski 
developed the model in terms of indigenously applied agricultural research14. 
The demand is hypothesized to be a function of the size and other 
characteristics of the state farm output, agricultural input prices, farmer 
education, the use of extension services, agricultural research in other states, 
and the price on indigenous applied research. The influence of farm interest 
groups on the demand for public research is captured in a behavioral equation 
which allocates state government revenue to agricultural research as a function 
of farm size distribution, tenure status, the entrepreneurial activity of the State 
Agricultural Experiment Station director, amount of state government revenue, 
farm organization membership, and past expenditures for applied agricultural 
research. 
Rose-Ackerman and Evenson (1985) expand that analysis to include the 
effects of federal grants. They studied the effects of reapportionment of state 
14 For practical purposes indigenously applied agricultural research, is the same as the most 
general concept of agricultural research. It is assumed that demand and supply of agricultural 
research are structurally defined by indigenous elements, such as the environment and 
production patterns. 
41 
legislatures mandated by U.S. Supreme Court, and they considered that the 
overall importance of farming to a state, in terms of income and population, 
measures farmers' political influence and partially determines research 
expenditures patterns. The study explicitly differentiates between research and 
extension spending. While research expenditures are expected to get the 
support of relatively large and wealthy farmers, extension expenditures are 
expected to be supported by small and low-ncome producers. Which group 
support research or extension budgets the most is a matter of who benefits the 
most from each class of expenditure. 
The public research studies above may have downplayed the importance 
of farm product consumers as beneficiaries and demanders of agricultural 
research. In their study, Rose-Ackerman and Evenson argue that the impact of 
agricultural state production on total supply is not large enough to affect prices. 
Therefore, state consumers have little incentive to pressure for higher research 
budgets. However, there are two factors which might have been overlooked: the 
long run expansion of supply due to interstate competition and spillover effects 
of state research; and the importance and implications of federal matching 
funds for state agricultural research budgets15. These two elements support the 
case for reconsidering consumer benefits as an additional determinant of public 
agricultural research, even at the state level. 
The implementation of new techniques depends not only on the set of 
techniques available to the firm in a specific period of time, but also on the 
interaction of several other elements, such as variable input prices or ratio of 
prices; the latter is the key element in Hicks {1932) and also the focus of the 
induced innovation hypothesis (Ruttan and Hayami, 1988). Induced innovation 
15 As every dollar of federal money must generally be matched by one dollar of state funding, it 
implies that only 20% of extension dollars are freely allocated by states over and above the 
required matching share (Rose-Ackerman and Evenson, pp.6). 
considers that the ratio of input prices largely is determined by the factor 
endowment of the country or region. Therefore, the implemented techniques 
will reflect bias tqwards the relative abundant factor. 
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New t~chnologies bring with them fixed investments, either in the form of 
capital or human assets. The developing literature considers fixed costs as one 
of the key factors explaining adoption patterns (Feder et al., 1985). The size of 
the firm budget for fixed inputs, along with the investment requirements of the 
new technique, will influence the implementation decision. The budget for fixed 
resources can be considered to be an investment budget whose size depends 
on the rate of capital accumulation. Mundlak (1988b) hypothesized that the rate 
of adoption depends on the rate of capital accumulation. The firm's investment 
budget, completely defined, should include not ·only owned resources, but credit 
resources available to the firm as well. Therefore, the budget constraint might 
shift outward to the right if the firm improves its access to borrowed funds. 
Consequently, the overall situation in the financial market in terms of the supply 
and demand of funds, as well as -the corresponding interest rates, may have a 
significant influence in the rate of technology adoption, as is suggested by 
Feder,et al.(1985). 
Besides the above microeconomic factors, Griliches (1957) found 
empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the rate of adoption, what 
Griliches called rate of acceptance, depends on the superiority of new 
technology over traditional technology. He used two measures for comparing 
corn HYV (High Yield Variety) and open pollinated varieties: the average 
increase in yield in bushels per acre, and the long-run average pre-hybrid yield 
of corn. 
Regarding investments in human capital, empirical studies ( Griliches, 
1957, 1964; Cline, 1975; Knutson and Tweet en, 1979) have shown the 
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significance of education and information in the adoption of technologies, in that 
education and information act as proxies for investments in human capital. 
Evenson (1984, 1988) reported that extension services or adult education are 
substitutes for formal schooling. 
The developing agriculture literature expands the analysis to account for 
the adoption of new technology under risk, due to output and price uncertainty. 
Just, Zilberman and Rausser (1980) analyzed the impact of farmer wealth, the 
degree of risk aversion, and the relative riskiness of new technologies with 
respect to traditional techniques. These factors were characterized as barriers 
which inhibit the adoption of new techniques. Just and Zilberman (1983) 
suggest that risk attitudes and the distributional characteristics of returns per 
unit of land under traditional and modern technologies play a key role in 
determining the role of farm size in technology adoption. When dealing with 
risk and uncertainty, Feder, Just and Zilberman (1985), found that farmer 
exposure to new technology plays a key role in forming their subjective 
probabilities, hence the importance of the availability of information and 
education variables for the adoption decision. 
Given the logic behind the firm's adoption of new techniques, the way in 
which public policy can influence the rate of adoption depends on their 
effectiveness in influencing the variables that induce firms to chose between 
techniques. Specific public policy mechanisms can alter the ratio of input 
prices, the expectation for future output prices, and the riskiness of agricultural 
technologies and investments, thereby influencing the adoption decision. 
The literature dealing with this topic comes mostly from research on 
agriculture development and is focused on the distributional effects of 
technology, (Feder and Gehrson, 1985; Just and Zilberman, 1988; Miller and 
Tolley,1989). Aside of Teigen's simulation work (1988), there is a lack of 
research analyzing the impact of U.S. agricultural polices on the rate of 
technology adoption. 
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Just and Zilberman (1985) develop a model for the U.S. which translates 
the difference in resource constraints and farm characteristics into markets 
effects, allowing the derivation of income distribution effects as measured by 
certainty equivalent measures. The study develops a classification of four farm 
regimes, according to the different constraints -- land quantity and quality, credit 
availability, and human characteristics -- faced by farmers. These regimes, or 
classes, are technologically lagging farms, highly leveraged farms, risk 
diversifiers, and specialized modern farms. The study hypothesizes that 
agricultural policies affect both the distribution of farms among classes and the 
response with in each class. Therefore aggregate response will depend on the 
predominant class or regime and on the characteristic response to a specific 
policy of that regime. 
General Evaluation of Selected Work 
The previous research documents the background for three key issues in 
this research: the policy analysis framework upon which this research is based, 
the endogenous technical approach, and the main economic issues of 
technical change in agriculture. 
The first body of literature supports the relevance of applied classical 
welfare economics as a method for evaluating social effects of public policies. It 
also provides guidelines to overcome the shortcomings of welfare economics 
when dealing with equity and distributional effects and subjective interpersonal 
comparisons. Finally, based on Rausser•s theoretical contribution, a policy 
preference function (PPF) is hypothesized to be an empirical, tractable 
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representation of the relative weights assigned by policy makers to the different 
interests affected by the implemented public policy. 
The previous studies dealing with the simultaneous analysis of public 
research and producers' support policies support applied welfare economics 
as a valid tool; but their findings are restricted by the short comings in the 
modeling of the supply relationship. The common constraint of previous studies 
is the use of supply functions and elasticities which have been estimated 
without allowing for interaction between public research programs and direct 
government intervention. This synergism is precisely the issue this dissertation 
intends to address. 
Regarding the evolution of the endogenous technology approach, a 
complete model developed by Mundlak was used to illustrate the approach. In 
general the endogenous technology approach implies that variables besides 
input and output physical quantities called state variables, as well as 
constraints, do have a key role on production function and producer response 
estimation. 
Finally, the main variables influencing the supply (generation) and 
demand {adoption) of new technologies were reviewed. From the literature 
reviewed, it is clear the importance of public policy in the generation and 
adoption of new technologies. Becauseit is difficult from private firms to 
approriate benefits from invention in agriculture, the role of public-supported 
research becomes evident. Consequently, the demand for research responds 
to private and public factors, the latter being the result of the political and 
economic bargaining process between farmers, agribusinesses, and 
consumers. 
In the next chapter, the production economics methodological issues will 
be developed to provide the foundation for specifying an empirical model to 
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estimate technology-response coefficients and supply elasticities. The single 
most important feature of the model will be its ability to integrate public policy 
effects and technological change. 
CHAPTER Ill 
PRODUCERS• RESPONSE, FUNCTIONAL FORM AND 
ENDOGENOUS TECHNICAL CHANGE 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a production economics 
framework for the analysis and later estimation of producer response 
parameters considering the impact of technological change and of government 
policies. In achieving this objective two broad methods available to estimate 
production-response parameters, mathematical programing and econometric 
techniques, will be discussed. The emphasis will be to evaluate overall 
advantages and disadvantages, as well as theoretical support for the estimates 
and the most common obstacles in their empirical application. 
The second section of this chapter presents the steps to specify empirical 
production functions. A major issue is the analysis of the implications of the 
characteristics of the production function and the restrictions that they imply. 
Another important issue is the linkage between the functional form of the 
production fucntion and the consistency of the corresponding response 
parameters. 
The next section looks at the hypothesis of endogenous technical 
change and its relevance for producer response analysis. The most relevant 




Finally, the chapter ends by integrating the previous topics and providing 
a consistent theoretical framework suitable for the analysis of the effects of 
government policies and technological change on producer• response. 
In the context of this research, the term producer• response refers 
primarily to the output supply elasticity. However, it also is of great interest to 
look at the ample set of economic parameters used to measure the change in 
producers behavior due to changes in exogenous and/or policy variables: 
production elasticities, technical change bias indicators, elasticities or marginal 
rate of substitution, productivity elasticities, factor demand elasticities, supply 
elasticity, and elasticities of output with respect to a set of variables which are 
called technology shifters. Each of these parameters, as well as the technology 
shifter variables will be defined properly as the discussion progresses. 
Methodologies to Estimate Producer Response Elasticities 
Given that price policies are the most frequent way in which governments 
intervene in agriculture, methodological and empirical issues of output supply 
and factor demand elasticities have always been an important part of the 
literature. Because of its importance, there is a large amount of research on this 
topic and a great diversity in the supply response estimates. This diversity 
mainly is due to differences in the methods employed, time periods analized, 
the levelof aggregation used, the explanatory variables considered, and the 
source and quality of the data utilized. 
From all the factors mentioned above, methodological differences are at 
center stage. The existence of several alternative methodologies immediately 
suggests that each methodology has advantages and disadvantages, and the 
application of each one will depend of the specifics of the problem studied. 
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There are several published studies which have summarized the state of 
the arts in supply response estimation16. From those studies, it can be 
considered that there are two broad type of methodologies to estimate supply 
response: econometric methods estimation and mathematical programming 
methods. Each methodology has its own. merits. Th,is discussion will start by 
examining at the m·athe!llatical programming method which is the most flexible, 
but less popular method.· 
Mathematical Programming Method 
The mathematical programming method also is known as RFA, or 
reference farm approach (Sharples, 1969). RFA implies building and estimating 
a linear mode! to describe the production system of each of a number of 
reference farms. Each production system specifies a set of linear, additive 
production functions for every production outcome feasible to each firm, given 
the restrictions on productive resources (Colman, 1983). By iteratively solving 
the system for several sets of prices under the condition that the objective 
function (e.g. profit maximization) is being optimized, supply-price relationships 
can be traced out for each commodity and reference farm. Although no 
functional relationship i~ obtained from m~ximizing the model, a function can be 
fitted through each of the price and output pairs estimated through the iterative 
solution of the model. 
The most important advantage of a programing model is its flexibility to 
account for almost every economic and institutional factor affecting the farm 
16 For a complete review of this issue seeAskari, H. and Cummings, J.T. (1976,1977); Colman, 
D. (1983); and Rastegary-Henneberry,S. and Tweeten, L.G. (1991). 
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production system. This flexibility allows for the optimal quantity to be related to 
all product and input prices, allowing in this way the estimation of all production 
.. effects,.•17 a luxury not enjoyed by econometric estimation methods. 
Given the flexibility of a mathematical programing model, the way in 
which a government intervention variable can be modeled offers far more 
advantages than such in modeling econometric models. Given that 
representative farms are the objects being modeled, it is possible to introduce a 
sufficiently large and explicit number of activities to account for almost any 
specific details involved in a farm program. Also, because there is no need for a 
consistent and large set of time series observations, the changing nature of farm 
programs is not a problem that the RFA approach can not handle. If the set of 
representative farms have been carefully selected an aggregate impact of 
government intervention can be estimated by aggregating individual impacts. 
One of this approach biggest challenges comes from the fact that it is a 
data-intensive method and consequently its effectiveness relies first of all on 
data availability and quality. Although large amounts of data are needed, they 
can be verified with the help from field or extension agents, and by producers. 
The existence of large and up-to-date farm budget generators provides in most 
cases with a reliable source of information to this kind of models. 
Together with the advantages described above come the disadvantages 
of a mathematical programing model. The first level of difficulties are at the 
modeling stage. Determining the reference farms and defining the activities and 
constraints are complex tasks, especially if the model is to avoid aggregation 
bias and consistency with economic theory at the farm and aggregate levels 
17 As suggested by Colman(1983), the word "effects" instead of parameters. This is to account 
for the fact that the estimated relationships are not likely to be smooth or continuos, therefore 
would not be possible to summarize them in any single parameter. 
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(Colman, 1983). When trying to account for technical change, all feasible 
production function points must be specified completely as alternative activities 
and their correspondent restrictions. New data requirements to model technical 
change and non-linear functions, as well as to provide continous feedback to 
the model after each optimal outcome_ and before the next iteration is computed, 
add additional complications to this. approach. In short: 
the demands on data and research manpower required· to solve all 
the problems attendant in developing such a complete and complex 
supply model as the RFA mode/lead this writer to 'the conclusion 
that a short-cut solution is desirable for most problems.1B 
This quote from Colman summarizes the potential and c.omplexity of the 
mathematical programing methods. Keeping in mind this method•s advantages 
and disadvantages, let us turn now to discuss the econometric methods to 
estimate supply response. 
Econometric Methods 
According to Colman (1983), and Rastegari-Henneberry and Tweeten 
(1991 ), there is a diversity of ways ih which supply response can be estimated 
using econometric methods. The distinct character in econometric estimation, is 
the origin of the function or model to be estimated, and if the supply elasticity is 
being estimated directly or computed through.indirectly from input demand 
coefficients. These issues are treated explicitly in Colman, and in Rastegari-
Hennberry and Tweeten. 'They evaluate the di{ferenteconometric specification 
18 Colman, 1983, p.216 
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and estimation methods on their theoretical, statistical and empirical merits to 
produce consistent and reliable supply parameters. That said, the following is a 
brief discussion of the merits of three alternative econometric approaches: direct 
estimation, duality, and indirect estimation. 
Direct Estimation Method 
The most popular method, direct e.stimation implies the specification of 
an adhoc supply model, to which data is fitted to obtain estimates for the 
parameters of a function and, therefore, for the .supply elasticity. While output 
quantity, or acres, are used as the dependent variable, output and input prices 
are used as explanatory variables. Thi method's appeal of this method is its 
simplicity in terms of data requirements and estimation procedures. Whether a 
single equation or a simultaneous equation approach is used, this direct 
estimation is characterized and criticized by the weak theoretical relationship 
between the specified supply function and the underlying production 
economics theory. The theoretical support for the model to be estimated is of an 
ad hoc nature. 
This technique is more appropriate when the objective is forecasting 
short run production levels instead of estimating structural parameters 
(Colman,1983). Another advantage of this approach is its ability to generate 
immediate response estimates from relatively simple resources. The weak 
linkage to production economics theory is by far its most serious drawback. 
Duality Method. 
The duality method is based upon the "dual" solution to both profit 
maximization and cost minimization problems, which are the indirect profit 
function and the indirect cost function, respectively. More precisely duality, 
refers to the existence, under appropriate regularity conditions, of 
"dual functions" which embody the same essential information on ... 
technology as familiar primal functions ... Dual functions describe the 
results of optimizing responses to input and output prices and 
constraints rather than global responses to input and output 
quantities as in the corresponding primal functions.19 
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The dual approach attractiveness comes from the well-known results of 
the Envelope Theorem. The first result, also known as Hotelling's Lemma, 
establishes that by partially differentiating the indirect profit function with respect 
to output and input prices, the output supply and factor demands are obtained. 
The second result known as Shephard's. Lemma indicates that by taking the 
partial derivatives of the indirect cost function with respect to input prices the 
conditional (Hicksian) input demand functions are obtained. 
There are two main advantages of duality. First is its algebraic simplicity, 
which allows it to handle more complex functional forms and in turn implies less 
restrictions on the estimated equations. 
A reason for the increasing popularity of duality in applied economic 
analysis is that it allows greater flexibility in the specification of factor 
demand and output supply response equations and permits a very 
close relationship between economic theory and practice. 2o 
Secondly, the indirect profit function allows for the simultaneous 
determination of supply and input demand, reduced-form equations as 
functions of exogenous variables. Therefore, the simultaneous equation 
estimation bias can be avoided (Lau and Yotopoulos, 1972). Moreover, 
because the input demands and output supply functions are derived from profit 
19 Young et al,1987, p. 3 
20 Lopez, 1982, p. 353 
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or cost functions, the assumptions of profit maximization, cost minimization, and 
competitive markets are assured (Rastegari and Tweeten, 1991 ). 
Like other methods to estimate producer responses, the dual approach 
has its disadvantages. Rastegari and Tweeten (1991}, state this approach is 
best suited for microeconomic-firm level studies, and applications to aggregate 
level data render questionable results. From the studies discussed in Rastegari 
and Tweeten, the ones estimating elasticities with the dual method gave the 
largest short-run elasticities for the majority of the products whose elasticities 
were estimated by various methods. 
Factor Shares or Indirect Estimation 
Another method to estimate supply-response parameters is estimating 
cost factor shares and, from them deriving the desired parameters. Because 
this method implies estimating response parameters from factor shares, this is 
an indirect method of estimation. This method and the one previously reviewed 
are the most traditional approaches for estimating response parameters. 
The factor shares method primarily is associated with a production 
function of the Cobb-Douglas form (C-D). For the C-D production function, the 
first-order conditions for the profit maximization problem provide production 
elasticities (C-D parameters) which are, under competitive equilibrium, equal to 
the factor shares. Therefore, as suggested by Klein (1953), the C-D production 
fucntion parameters can be obtained directly from expenditures and revenue 
data, which in general is readily available. 
Given the maintained hypothesis of competitive equilibrium, and the 
structural characteristics of the agricultural sector the one to one 
correspondence between factor shares and production elasticitiies can only 
occur in the long run. Therefore, direct implementation of this method will imply 
that the estimated parameters are long-run response coefficients. To address 
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this issue, Tyner and Tweeten (1967) introduced a methodology which allows 
for short-run disequilibrium of the production elasticities, consequently to differ 
from the actual factors shares. Estimates of supply elasticity are based on a 
weighted averag~ of the input elasticity with respect to output price. The 
weights in this estimate are the production elasticities, defined as the elasticity 
of output with respect to each input (Griliches, 1959). 
This method produces estimates within a background consistent with 
production theory. The theoretical underpinnings are as strong as the duality 
approach, although with more restrictive assumptions, given its relationship with 
the Cobb-Douglas production function. The main general disadvantage is the 
relationship with the Cobb-Douglas production function. Also, Rastegari and 
Tweeten (1991), pointed out that if prices are incorrectly defined, this method 
may overestimate the true supply elasticities. Furthermore, Tweeten and 
Quance (1969) argued that the elasticity estimates coming from this method are 
primarily related to increasing farm prices, because fixity of assets tend to 
reduce the supply elasticity applicable to falling farm prices .21 Notice that 
supply elasticities are estimated based on resources adjustments (input 
response to output prices, and elasticities of production). Supply elasticities 
tend to be reduced in periods of decreasing farm prices {Tweeten and Quance, 
1969). Despite of these disadvantages, it will be shown later that this method 
has characteristics which make it appealing under an endogenous technology 
approach. 
A general limitation of all regression methods, is the limited number of 
time series observations usually available to researchers. The number of 
21 Tweeten,L. and L. Quance {1969), p.351. 
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observations must be greater than the number of independent variables; the 
greater the difference, or degrees of freedom, the better. This issue is closely 
related to the limited number of cross-price effects that can be represented. 
Another limiting assumption is that the parameters are non-stochastic, which 
could be acceptable for a relatively short period of time (again putting pressure 
on the degrees of freedom). However, despite all of the above "it is a technique 
which has shown itself capable of generating acceptable and useful results. "22 
'When technical change is considered in the econometric approaches, it 
usually is represented with a trend variable and by considering the intercept as 
a measure of disembodied technical change. When government intervention 
variables are considered, it is by using the policy variables defined by Houck 
and his collaborators. These policy variables address the issue of the relevant 
price for producers as a short-run response, but do not measure the effect of 
government policy influence on technological/investment decisions. This lack 
of flexibility to incorporate technical change and the interrelationship with 
government policy, can be overcome partiallywith appropriate modeling. 
Functional Form Choice in Applied Production Economics 
The choice of functional form for the production function is at the heart of 
applied production analysis. The choice of functional form implies a choice in 
the set of maintained hypothesis and restrictions that will be carried through the 
empirical research. Once the model has been specified, classical statistical 
tests are conducted only under the hypothesis that the model is true, and the 
22 Colman, 1983, p.224 
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conclusions drawn are only valid within the confines of that model (Chambers, 
1988, p. 159}. The set of assumed maintained hypothesis and the set of 
restrictions implied, are very closely related to the concept of flexibility. 
The plausibility of empirical results will depend on the appropriateness of 
the functional form to the problem being studied. This is the obvious and most 
important principle to keep in mind, that functional form should relate to the 
objectives of the analysis. Besides this obvious criterion, Fuss, McFadden and 
Mundlak (1978} proposed a set of criteria which may be considering when 
selecting a functional form: 
1. Parsimony in parameters: The functional form should contain no 
more parameters than those needed for consistency of the 
maintained hypothesis. A large number of parameters usually 
brings about potential multicollinearity problems and implies a 
loss of degrees of freedom. 
2. Ease of interpretation: Complex (rich in parameters} functional 
forms may contain unreasonable implications which are not easily 
detected. The more intuitive the economic interpretation of the 
parameters the more desirable a functional form is. 
3. Computational ease: The tradeoff between the computational 
requirements of a linear in parameters functional form should be 
carefully measure weighed against the thoroughness of the 
empirical analysis. Current advances in computation tools allow, if 
needed, for the cost effective use of relationships which are non-
linear in the parameters. 
4. Interpolative robustness: Within the relevant sample, the 
functional form should show a behavior consistent with economic 
theory. 
5. Extrapolative robustness: When the objective is to produce 
forecasts, the behavior of the functional form outside the range of 
observed data should be compatible with economic theory and 
with the maintained hypothesis. 
To the most important issue of flexibility, consider the classification, 
offered by Fuss, et al. (1978} of the relevant economic effects of interest to 
applied production analysis. Their quantification in terms of first and second 
derivatives is presented in TABLE. 1. 
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The table includes (n+ 1 )(n+2)/2 distinct economic effects, which 
characterizes the usual comparative statics properties of a production function 
at a given point. To determine the function value at a point in terms of economic 
effects, those formulas can be solved for first and second partial derivatives, 
f = y (3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
f .. =[a··(S· +S·)+e·S· +e·S·]••y/2X·X· IJ IJ I J I I J J I"" I J (3.4) 
Consequently, "a necessary and sufficient condition for a functional form to 
reproduce comparative statics effects at a point without imposing restrictions 
across these effects is that it have (n+1)(n+2)/2 distinct parameters.23 From 
these results it can be confirmed that the traditional linear homogeneous Cobb-
Douglas only allows for n+ 1 distinct parameters. Consequently, it can hardly be 
called a flexible functional form. In contrast, and assuming non-homogeneity, 
the Generalized Leontief, Translog, and Quadratic functional forms allow for 
(n+ 1 )(n+2)/2 distinct parameters, therefore are true flexible functional forms.24 
23 Fuss, McFadden, Mundlak, 1982, p. 231 
24 For a complete discussion on the properties of these and other functional forms refer to 
Chambers (1988, pp. 160-181}, and Fuss, McFadden and Mundlak (1978, pp.230-240}. 
TABLE 1 
CLASSIFICATION OF PRODUCTION ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS 
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ECONOMIC NUMBER OF 
EFFECT FORMULA DISTINCT 
EFFECTS 
Output level y = f(x) 1 
Returns to scale I!= ( f.xifi) I fi 1 
1=1 
n 
Distributive share Si = Xifi I LXjfj n- 1 
j=1 
Own 11price•• elasticity Ej =Xifii /fi n 
Elasticity of -f .. ff~ +2(f·· ff.f.)-f·· ff? n(n -1) II I IJ I J JJ J 
Substitution 
O"ij = 
1/X·f· +1/X·f· 2 I I J J 
Source: Fuss, Melvyn, Daniel McFadden, and Yair Mundlak. 1978. "A SuJVey of Functional 
Forms in the Economic Analysis of Production." In Production Economics: A Dual 
Approach to Theoty and Applications. Volume 1. Melvyn Fuss and Daniel McFadden 
editors. North Holland. p.231. 
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Although flexibility is a desirable characteristic of functional forms in 
applied economics, it does not come without caveats. First, flexibility implies few 
restrictions on parameters but ·limits the range of technologies that can be 
characterized. This limitation comes from the fact that flexible functional forms 
are algebraically too complex to be analyzed as primal, so a dual formulation 
almost always is used. However, "fundamental duality results imply that any 
specification of a cost or profit function places some restrictions on the 
technology ... , these (flexible) functions appear to be more limiting that originally 
expected." 25 A further problem arises with generalized quadratic forms 
because these functions are very inflexible in representing separable 
technologies. Consequently, it can be concluded that flexible functional forms 
are preferred to traditional less flexible functions such as the original Cobb-
Douglas and CES -:- not because their ability to closely approximate arbitrary 
technologies, but because of the far fewer restrictions they place on estimation. 
There is no panacea in applied production economics, as is generally 
the case in any other branch of applied economics. There is a set of desirable 
properties with known advantages and disadvantages, and the researcher must 
weight the tradeoffs. The analysis's objective ultimately is the researcher's 
guiding force in selecting the specific functional form. In summary, "choosing a 
functional form is more a craft than a science. ••25 
For the estimation of supply elasticities, the literature highly values those 
estimation approaches in which the contribution of production economic theory 
is significant, e.g. duality or primal models. To maintain consistency, it should 
be also expected, that when estimating production functions, the functional form 
25 Chambers, 1988, p.173. 
26 Chambers, 1978, p. 159. 
which adequately incorporates technology also should be consistent with 
producers• optimizing behavior. That is, it must provide a sound basis to 
estimate input demand and supply elasticities. 
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The ·above 'can be better illustrated with the following example. For an 
engineer to·build a house (supply, function), he must be sure that the foundation 
' ' r ~ -
(economic theory, production function) is strong enough to support it. On the 
' ' 
other hand, when building the foundation (estimating production function 
' -
param~ters) he must b~ sure that there is a house design (supply and input 
demand functions) which corresponds to it. Otherwise, .the foundation will have· 
' -
no use, and buildi~g foundations is not an objective 'itself: 
The economic literature has plenty of estimates of production functions 
which do not necessarily allow for the consistent development, estimation or 
- ' 
computation of producers behavioral functions. This issue is of particular 
' ' 
importance in the case of flexible forms and when employing endogenous 
technology approach; as it will be shown in the next section. 
Endogenous Technical Change and Functional Form 
For Mundlak (1988), technical' change is defined as a change in the 
- -
collection of all techniques available to producers. ft:. technique .can be defined 
as a unique input arrangement available to produ~ers which if implemented 
allows for the production of one unit of a predetermined output. Each technique 
is represented by a produf?tion function. This definition of technique implies that 
-there are two sets of techniques: the set of techniques available, and the set of 
implemente.d techniques. The latter is a subset of the former. The emergence of 
new techniques as a result of scientific and applied research activities implies a 
change in technology. However, producers following the relevant set of prices-
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and technology shifter variables will determine which subset is implemented. 
This implemented technology is the subset for which actual evidence exists and 
which has concrete implications in the level of real production of agricultural 
goods. 
The methodological objective is twofold. The first, is provide a mean to 
account for the set of all the techniques available. The second, is to develop a 
model which simultaneously accounts for the set of implemented techniques. 
Thinking in dynamic terms, the task is to integrate the continuos generation of 
new knowledge and/or techniques (technological change), with the economic 
process of adopting new techniques by producers. 
Consider the following real-valued function to be a production fucntion 
satisfying all regularity conditions: 
y = f(x;e) (3.5} 
where y is the maximum amount of output to be produced from any given set of 
inputs x and where q represents the vector of all its parameters. Also, consider 
that each parameter is a function of technology shifter variables 'Yi : 
(3.6) 
Then it can be concluded that the implemented technology is 
endogenous to the model in the sense that it depends on the set of state 
variables (Mundlak, 1988). The implemented technology is determined jointly 
by set of all available techniques (supply of technology) and by the set of state 
variables. Moreover, under the induced innovation hypothesis it also can be 
argued that the available technology is endogenous to the extent in which the 
63 
relevant prices are considered in the set of state or technology shifter variables. 
Moreover, Danin and Mundlak (1979) showed that capital accumulation results 
in the employment of capital-intensive techniques, and that the introduction of 
capital-intensive techniques requires capital accumulation. 
Based on the model (3.5)-(3.6), define a set of parameters which will be 
used to extract information regarding the technical change process is defined. 
First, consider the elasticities of production with respect to the technology 
shifters (Sy~<). which provide information about the response on total output due 
to a change in a technology shifter: 
(3.7) 
Next consider the elasticities of the marginal rate of technical substitution 
(Bi,')'k) suggested by Basmann, Hayes and Slottje (1987). These parameters are 
defined as: 
dyi 
Yk ay· () - J 




These parameters indicate the change in the marginal rate of substitution 
between two inputs given a change in a technology shifter. In other words, 
these elasticities provide information about the pairwise input variation. 
In the general case, the elasticities shown in (3.7) and (3.8), as well as 
the regular production elasticities would be variable and dependent on input 
quantities and prices. 
Later in this research, it will be evident that this endogenous technical 
change approach, provides a powerful analytical tool for the impact of 
government policies on technical change. It is also useful in estimating the 
effects of technical change and government intervention in supply response 
parameters. 
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From the review of literature regarding endogenous technical change in 
the previous chapter, recall that most studies have dealt with the estimation of a 
production relationship to draw conclusions regarding the nature of the 
structure and change of technologies. Fawson, Shumway, and Bassmann 
(1990), distinguish themselves for the work done in estimating the "unusual" 
aggregate Marshallian uncompensated factor demand elasticities for the 
northeastern states. Although no previous empirical work on Marshallian 
uncompensated elasticities was found, their results in terms of cross-price 
effects seems to be consistent with existing research. Notice that the cross-
price definitions given by this type of elasticities, can classify inputs only as 
gross substitutes or complements. No income (cost) effect is considered in 
order to classify the inputs as net complements or substitutes. No attempt to 
estimate the supply elasticity parameter was made. 
Another similarity among the studies reviewed is the use of a production 
function of the Cobb-Douglas family. The set of studies by Mundlak and 
collaborators, by Basmann, Hayes, Slottje, and Molina (1987), by Swami, Lupo 
and Sneed (1989), by Fawson, Shumway, and Basmann (1990), and the one 
by Fulginiti and Perrin (1991) all use the Cobb-Douglas formulation to specify 
production elasticities functions. Only Frisvold (1991) uses a different functional 
form in the production function. Frisvold's endogenous technology model is 
based on a nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function. To 
65 
illustrate the above following are the production functions functions used in two 
of the reviewed studies. 
The research by Swamy, Lupo, and Sneed (1989) proposes a Stochastic 
Elasticities Cobb-Douglas (SECD) function, from which the Generalized 
Fechner-Thurstone is a special case. The class of SECD used in that study is 
defined as: 
Y(X; 8) = Bll {AiXi)9i(Yk) (3.9) 
i=1 
m 
ei = 1ti + 1tioC + I, 1tij<Oij + eij 
j=1 
(3.1 0) 
where, y, is the maximum amount of output producible at timet (all subscripts t 
have been omitted) from any given set of vector of n inputs X; B is a lognormal 
variable which combines the usual intercept with a random disturbance term. 
Ai1S are defined as each factor-augmenting function. The variables e i(y) are 
non-negative stochastic variables representing technical methods applied and 
change over time, as those methods change. Each of the e i(y) also represents 
an elasticity of output with respect to the ith input. The e i(y) is assumed to 
respond to changes in input prices, <Oj, and in scale of operations C. 
A less general form called Generalized Fechner-Thurstone (GFT), is 
proposed in Basmann, Hayes, and Slottje {1987) and used by Fawson, 
Shumway, and Bassmann {1990). The GFT function is defined as 





where then-tuple 8 of positive-valued functions, e i (y) is the parameter vector 
of F(X;E>). Variables C and COj are defined as in {3.5). For constant y, the GFT, as 
well as the SECD, satisfy the usual Cobb-Douglas properties: homogeneous of 
degree LiS i , strongly separable and homothetic in X, and constant elasticity of 
substitution equal to unity. Notice that if in equation (3.5), Ai = 1, then the SECD 
reduces to a GFT. 
The use of a Cobb-Douglas functional form within a random coefficient 
framework dates from the work of Marschak and Andrews {1944). Later 
developments includes Ulveling and Fletcher (1970) and De Janvry (1972a, 
1972b). In fact, GFT and SECD functions are special cases of the generalized 
power function developed by De Janvry (1972b). 
The lack of research into estimating supply and input demand elasticities, 
based on an endogenous technology approach, is due perhaps to the relative 
complexity of the functional form involved and of the algebraic difficulties in 
solving for the primal or dual optimization problem. For example, one question 
is whether or not current price information should be included as a technology 
shifter variable. This issue is related to the phenomena of double-switching of 
technologies. The possibility of double-switching or reswitching technologies 
was first discussed by Joan Robinson, and is defined as the "possibility that the 
same method of production maybe the most profitable ... at more than one rate of 
profit.. .Implying that the same physical goods will have more than one value, ... 
because a different set of relative prices will be associated with each rate of 
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profit .. ''27 Conventional economics assumes that double-switching is not 
possible, because if it occurs there will not be a unique relationship between 
input proportions and factor prices. The production functions assumed by 
Basmann, Hayes, Slottje, and Molina (1987), and the one assumed by Swamy, 
Lupo, and Sneed (1989) allow for the possibility of reswitching. This is 
confirmed by looking at the following ratio: 
(::) =(::)(~:) (3.13) 
The expression in (3.13) is not unique, as the ratio (9it19kt) can be 
nonstationary, following different distributions in different time periods, perhaps 
returning to some earlier distribution (Swamy, Lupo, and Sneed, 1989). 
As will be shown later, the attempt to introduce endogenous technical 
change formulations in producer maximizing behavior could lead to 
mathematical expression which make no economic sense. Therefore, in order 
to assume functional forms as the GFT or SECD, simplifying assumptions must 
be made to avoid theoretical and empirical traps. 
This chapter can be summarized as follows: first, econometric methods 
are suitable for the estimation of supply response parameters. The robustness 
of the estimates will depend, among other things, on the support the model has 
from economic theory. Secondly, representation of the technology underlying 
producer behaviour increases the reliability and consistency of the estimates. 
The specification of the empirical model of this research will consider the set of 
characteristics desirable on a production function and their tradeoffs. 
27 Harcourt, 1969, p.388. 
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Finally, the endogenous technology approach provides a consistent 
methodology to represent the technological structure, and the technology 
adoption process. Although functions of the Cobb-Douglas form are classified 
as non-flexible, the above discussion has shown that the introduction of the 
endogenous technical change hypothesis in a Cobb-Douglas environment 
allows for a consistent modeling structure. The endogenous technology 
approach brings into play potential theoretical and empirical traps that should 
be avoided cautiously by the researcher so as not to invalidate the overall 
approach. 
The integration of the topics developed in this chapter provides 
guidelines for modeling technical change in production economics. The above 
will be the basis for the specification and estimation of the empirical model 
which is detailed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
SPECIFICATION OF THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The purpose of this chapter is to specify the empirical model, outline its 
theoretical implications and discuss econometric estimation of its parameters. 
The objective of the aggregate model described below is to provide estimates of 
producer-response parameters, taking into account the interdependence of 
government policies and technological change. To accomplish the objective, 
the model is built within an endogenous technical change framework and 
assumes producer behavior is consistent with profit maximization. 
In the development of this chapter, the following issues will be 
addressed: the choice of functional form of the production function, the supply 
inducing price, specification of the government intervention variable(s), and the 
lag structure of the relationship between public research expenditures and 
agricultural output. Each of these topics is addressed within the context of an 
aggregate agricultural model. The aggregate nature of the model has special 
implications for each of these topics. 
The chapter will be developed in five sections. The first deals with the 
choice of the functional form of the production function. On the basis of the 
selected production function and the assumption of profit maximization, the 
theoretical model is presented in the second section. The next section looks at 
the issues of supply inducing price and government-intervention variables. The 
fourth section presents an analysis of the lag structure of agricultural research 
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expenditures and agricultural output. In section five, technology shifters in 
addition to research expenditures are detailed. 
Functional Form of the Production Function 
It is apparent from the discussion in the previous chapter that a 
production function of a generalized Cobb-Douglas form, in which parameters 
are stochastic, is well-suited for modeling endogenous technical change. It will 
be shown that the Cobb-Douglas family functional form has the following 
advantages: flexibility, ease of interpretation, parsimonious, and consistency. It 
also will be shown later that this kind of functional form facilitates econometric 
estimation, without excessive pressure on the degrees of freedom. 
Consider the following case of a SECD production function for aggregate 
output: 











Where Y is the maximum output producible from any given vector of inputs X. 
Then-tuple e of positive-valued functions, 9i('Y) is the parameter vector of Y(X;e). 
The stochastic parameters A and 9i, are functions of technology shifter variables 
z and g respectively. Changes in the stochastic parameter A and in the vector 
of parameters q, are independent to the change in the quantity used of each 
input Xi· 
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Consider the definition of output elasticity with respect to an input as the 
ratio of marginal physical product to average physical product. Then, from (4.1) 
it can be shown that the corresponding ~elasticities are no longer constants, but 
functions of the technology shifters 'Y· 
(4.4) 
Although, given assumption (4.3) by taking first and second partial 
derivatives of (4.1 ), it can be shown that from all the effects shown in Table 3.1, 
this function allows ohly for n+1 distinct parameters, which is the same that for a 
traditional C-D. However, notice that: 
aa. 







Given equations (4.6) and (4.7), the correspondent elasticities with respect to 
technology shifters can be computed. There are k number of elasticities of the 
production elasticity with respect to technology shifters. Similarly, it can be 
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verified that the number of distinct parameters describing elasticities of marginal 
rate of technical substitution with respect to changes in technology shifters is 
kn(n-1)/2, which is the number of technology shifters (k), multiplied by the 
number of pairs corresponding to different marginal rates of technical 
substitution [n(n-1 )/2]. 
However, if in equation (4.3) the equality sign is replaced by an 
inequality sign, then all the (n+2)(n+ 1 )/2 economic effects presented in Table 
3.1 would be represented distinctly. To prove this, it is necessary only to show 
that the elasticities of substitution are not equal to one. This proof is contained 
in the appendix of Swamy, Lupo and Sneed (1989). 
Although ruling out assumption (4.3) implies that (4.1) becomes a fully 
flexible functional form, assumption (4.3) is kept. That assumption is retained 
because adding this flexibility imposes severe mathematical complications for 
the profit-maximization problem in which (4.1) will be optimized. Moreover, 
interpreting the concept of elasticity of substitution in the context of more than 
two inputs is not completely clear. Following the principle that more of a good 
always is preferred to less, it might be that the impossibility of distinctly 
identifying the elasticities of substitution could jeopardize the relevance of the 
model. Consequently, the choice of a SECD functional form is consistent with 
the objectives pursued and, the possibility to estimate elasticities of the 
marginal rates of substitution with respect to technology shifters compensates 
for not getting elasticities of substitution different from one. 
As it is implied in the paragraph above, the SECD function in (4.1) is a 
relatively flexible form in which full flexibility has been traded for simplicity, ease 
of interpretation, and a parsimonious form. The same intuitive interpretation of a 
traditional C-D is carried by (4.1 ). The number of parameters to be estimated, 
as in any other C-D function is small, although in this case the final number of 
73 
parameters to estimate will be greater and depend on the number of technology 
shifter variables (z,'Y) that the final model will have. As it is the case in most of 
the studies reviewed, a common problem of an endogenous technology 
approach is the fact that it is parameter-intensive due to the inclusion of the 
technology shifters. This is one of the most important reasons for a strong 
preference for production functions of the ,Cobb-Douglas family. 
The Theoretical Model 
To establish the model's theoretical base consider that agricultural 
producers make decisions in a manner consistent with profit maximization. 
Also, considering the production function in (4.1 ), that optimization can be 
described as maximizing: 
n n 
L = PA(z)[IXfi<r>- I, wiXi (4.8) 
i=1 i=1 
Where P and Wi, represent output and input prices respectively, and all other 
variables are as previously defined. The first-order conditions are represented 
by: 
e. 
L. =Py-1 =W· 
I X· I 
I 
(4.9) 




e.= I I 
I Py 
(4.1 O) 
The above is the well-known result of the traditional Cobb-Douglas 
function; the elasticity of production with respect to a factor Xi is equal to its 
correspondent expenditure share. ·Appealing to Euler's theorem. the result 
below follows: 
n x. ay n n w .x. 
L - 1 - = L a. = L 1 1 = e 
i = 1 Y axi i = 1 1 i = 1 Py (4.11) 
This implie~ that the sum of the production elasticities (8i) is equal to the 
degree of homogeneity (9); likewise, the degree of homogeneity is equal to the 
sum of all factor shares. Furthermore, under long-run equilibrium conditions, 
this implies that total output is just exhausted, meaning long-run, competitive 
profits are zero (Henderson and Quandt, 1980). Recall that one of the key 
assumptions of a long run competitive equilibrium is the existence of the free 
entry and exit of firms. 
Regarding the form of the elasticities, the particular SECD function 
defined in (4.1) have the same characteristics as the well known traditional 
Cobb-Douglas (CD). As in the CD, the SECD function represents consistent 
profit maximizing behavior in the second stage of production, therefore 9=:E8i<1 
or decreasing but positive marginal returns. Also, recall that the parameters 8i 
are non-negative. 
By simultaneously solving the system of first order conditions (4.9), the 
corresponding input demand equations are determined. Upon replacing them 
into the production function, the output supply function may be obtained. 
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Thereafter, the supply and input demand elasticity expressions can be 
obtained. Any production economics textbook28 contains this derivation for the 
simple two-input case. 
The own-price, cross-price, and output price input demand expressions 





£ - 1 Xi,p-- 8 _ 1 (4.14) 
Given the assumptions of the values on the parameters E> and Si, 
equations (4.12) and (4.13) -are unambiguously negative, while (4.14) is 
unambiguously positive. These results are in agreement with production 
economic theory. However, equation (4.13) implies that all inputs are 
constrained to be complements. This imposes a serious restriction to the input 
demand parameters. The effects of this restriction can be overcome partially by 
focusing on elasticity parameters with -respect to technology shifters rather than 
input prices alone. This alternative is totally consistent with the model•s 
purpose and reinforces the emphasis on the methodology•s technology side. 
The supply elasticity parameter for this SECD case is also a 
generalization for then input case of the two-input result. and is given by the 
following expression: 
28 See for example Beattie and Taylor (1985), pp. 125,159; and Debertin, D. (1986), pp. 219-
222. 
E> 
Ey,p = -1--E>-.. 
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(4.15) 
The above equa~ion defines a long-run supply elasticity, given the 
underlying assumption that all inputs are variable. To represent a short-run 
elasticity, the inputs which have to be taken into account in the definition of E> 
are the ones which are variable in the short-run, within a production cycle. 
Movement from the short to the long-run, implies that more inputs will become 
variable and will be included in the correspondent definition of e. As can be 
expected, the elasticity os supply increases as producers move from the short to 
the long-run.29 
Under long-run equilibrium conditions (B=1), inputs demand and output 
supply elasticities become infinitely elastic or undefined. This result is 
associated more with the long-run equilibrium of the firm, than with a 
representation of aggregate behavior, as it is the case in this research. 
Recall equation (4.11 ), which implies that under long-run equilibrium 
conditions the elasticity of production is equal to the corresponding factor 
shares, and consequently their sum is one. However, there are short-run 
discrepancies between the correspondent production elasticity and factor 
share, particularly in agriculture. This disequilibrium indicates that the process 
of resource adjustment in agriculture takes place over several production 
periods. Among the factors delaying the adjustment process are risk, , 
uncertainty, technical constraints, institutional rigidities, and psychological 
resistance to change (Nerlove, 1958). This adjustment process was formalized 
by Tyner and Tweeten(1965, 1967) using the following partial adjustment 
dynamic formulation: 
29 A more detailed explanation, and examples of this issue, can be found in the original works of 
Griliches (1958) and in Tyner and Tweeten (1966). 
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0 < g <1 (4.16) 
Where Fit is defined as the expenditure share of factor Xi at time period t; Fi,t-1 
as the previous period factor share corresponding to Xi; eit as the current 
elasticity of production or short-run equilibrium factor share; and gas the 
disequilibrium rate, which is constrained to be between zero and one because 
a tendency towards equilibrium.is assumed. 
The following general model to estimate the production parameters is 
obtained by combining equations (4.1), (4.10), and (4.16): 
(4.17a) 
0 < g <1 (4.17b) 
Where all variables are as defined earlier. 
Having defined the theoretical base of the model at its components, it is 
now appropriate to turn to the definition of the vector of y variables, the 
technology shifters. In particular, to the definition of variables relating to 
government intervention, the inducing-supply price, and the lag structure of 
agricultural research expenditures. 
Specification of Government Intervention Variables 
Since government programs started in 1933, the policy instruments 
utilized have varied significantly. The complex combination and continuous 
change in the different combinations of agricultural government intervention 
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(support prices, direct payments and supply control) make it very difficult to build 
a consistent time series to econometrically estimate the influence of government 
policies on supply and other economic parameters. Obviously, there is no 
question that government policies influence agriculture. The challenge is to 
define a variable or variables to summarize their impact on producers• behavior. 
Several authors have tried different ways of dealing with the estimation of 
supply elasticities incorporating government market intervention mechanisms.so 
A set of studies on wheat supply response, starting with Lidman and Bawden 
{1974), followed by Garst, et al. (1975) and Worthington {1988), introduced 
each instrument of the government program individually as an independent 
variable. As the complexity of government programs increased, the number of 
variables to consider also grew, resulting in a loss of degrees of freedom. The 
success of this approach relies on modeling policies which have been in effect 
for long periods of time. 
Another approach was introduced by Heimberger and is based on the 
hypothesis that the supply function itself may change due to government 
intervention. Therefore, different subsets of the sample of observations are 
identified, each corresponding to a particular set of policies. Studies of wheat 
by Morzuch, et. al (1980) and of corn by Lee, et. al (1985) used this sub-
samples approach to represent government instruments as individual 
independent variables for each sub-sample, maintaining then the problem of 
loss of degrees on freedom. 
Taking a different route, Houck and Ryan (1972) provided a framework in 
which the price and income support features of annual programs and the supply 
30 For a review of the different methods use to specify government market intervention in 
agriculture, see Del Valle (1989). 
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control aspects are summarized in a few variables. Their approach provides for 
construction of the following equation: 
PF = r PA (4.18) 
where, PA is the announced support price, PF is the weighted support price, r is 
an adjustment factor which incorporates the planting constraint associated with 
the announced support price. If there are no planting restrictions, then r equals 
unity; conversely, the larger the planting restrictions the more r approaches 
zero. 
For years, in which direct payments where offered to producers to idle 
land, Houck and Ryan developed the following additional expression: 
DP=wPR (4.19) 
where, DP is the weighted diversion payment, PR is the announced diversion 
payment; and w the adjustment factor, which is equal to one in the absence of 
limits in the acreage eligibility for diversion payments, and approaches to zero 
the smaller the eligible acreage is. 
Upon the methodological guidelines set by Houck and Ryan (1972), 
numerous studies were conducted. Houck, et al. {1976) produced a more 
comprehensive study which was followed by others such as Duffy {1985) for the 
case of corn; Duffy, et. al. (1987) for cotton; and Bailey and Womack {1985) for 
wheat. All these and other studies, while relying on Houck and Ryan's 
methodology, added new features to address specific problems and objectives. 
The results obtained by using the methods described were in most cases 
consistent with economic theory and provided effective ways to model 
government market intervention. However, from the brief review presented it 
can be said that all studies dealt with single commodity rather than aggregate 
agriculture estimation. Furthermore, the commodities to which the above 
methodologies were applied are characterized by relatively uniform farm 
programs. Products such as diary and oranges, in which other forms of 
government intervention cannot be addressed using Houck and Ryan's 
methodology. 
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For purposes of this research, it was impractical to develop similar 
aggregates measures to the ones presented in equations (4.14) and (4.15). 
This limitation becomes more evident when considering the diversity of 
government intervention instruments across the agricultural sector. The 
literature discusses the concept of excess capacity, which is for some 
researchers an indication of the effect of government intervention in agriculture. 
Although it has not been used within a framework of producer-response 
estimation, the excess capacity concept has the potential of fitting into the 
endogenous technology approach discussed earlier. The issue of excess 
capacity will be examined only as a means to represent the effects of 
government market intervention. 
The starting point is a working definition of excess capacity provided by 
Dvoskin (1988): 
Economic theory ... links the support of agricultural prices above 
market clearing to excess capacity. Thus, one could define excess 
capacity in agriculture as the difference between supply and 
demand at a given set of prices . 31 
This definition implies that excess capacity is a function of farm prices, 
which are influenced by farm policy. It is apparent from this observation that 
31 Dvoskin, Dan (1988), p. 5. 
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there is no one-to-one relationship between the size of excess capacity and 
government policies. However, Tweeten (1989) argues that llexcess capacity is 
a creation of and exists at the will of government. 11.32 Tweeten's conclusion is 
compatible with economic theory on long run equilibrium considerations. Long 
run excess capacity can be compatible only with economic theory in a market 
structure characterized by a differentiated product, many firms, free entry, and 
non-aggressive price competition (Chamberlain, 1939). Agriculture is far from 
being the case given as an "industry" with little product differentiation and with 
aggressive price competition. 
Although the actual excess capacity cannot be calculated, a proxy 
measure can indeed be used and. 11it represents the difference of what farmers 
could have produced (at the given price levels) and the value of production that 
can be cleared by the commercial market (domestic and foreign demand). JG3 A 
similar proxy measure has also been used in the past by Tyner and Tweeten 
(1964}, as well as by Quance and Tweeten (1972). 
A simplified representation of excess capacity consistent with the 
concepts used above is presented in figure 6. The line 81 represents the actual 
supply function for farm output. The supply line 82 is the hypothetical supply of 
farm output considering, that all land taken out of production by government 
programs is back on production. Line D1 represents the presumed actual total 
demand for farm output; because it includes non-
commercial exports the line D2 represents the total demand for agricultural 
output from commercial markets. 
It can be observed clearly that the difference between 81 and 82, 
represents the effects of supply-control programs, while the difference between 
32 Tweeten, Luther (1989), p.3. 
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Source: Dvoskin, Dan. 1988. •Excess Capacity in U.S. Agriculture: An Economic Approach to 
Measurement.• Research and Technical Division, ERS, USDA, Agricultural Economic 
Report No. 580. 
Figure 6. Excess Capacity Representation 
01 and 02 indicates the effect of demand-enhancing programs. The actual 
disappearance of this excess implies the effect of income support policies. 
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The excess capacity concept allows the identification of short term 
shocks and their relationship with government policies. For instance, after a 
sudden increase in export demand, 02 will move to the right, free market prices 
will increase, and the size of the difference between P1 and P2 will become 
smaller, implying less incentive for participation. S1 moves toward S2, and 
eventually reduces government outlays. The opposite effect also can be traced 
intuitively. The ability of excess capacity to reflect the interaction between 
' ' 
changes in government polices and changes in shock variables like weather 
and export demand is evident. 
This empirical measure of excess capacity is questioned by Sutton, et al., 
(1989); their most important criticism is that Ovoskin•s measure does not make 
any distinction between short and long-run based on variable and fixed inputs 
or resources. Therefore, they argue, Ovoskin does not provide a measure of or 
tendencies towards resource misallocation brought on by a policy nor the 
structural adjustments which could occur under domestic or trade policy 
reforms4. While the base of the criticism may be correct, the alternative 
suggested, the concept of overinvestment, does not have the measurement 
advantages as excess capacity does. 
Within the framework of this study, the use of excess capacity as a 
measure of government intervention offers three advantages. First, it provides a 
simply accounting for an aggregate effect of agricultural policies because it 
avoids the need to determine weighted average of the Houck and Ryan 
variables, PF (effective support price), and OP {effective diversion payment). 
Secondly, by singling out excess capacity as a feasible representation of 
34 Sutton, J., M. Young, and K. Alt (1989), p.28. 
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government intervention, the loss of degrees of freedom is reduced to a 
minimum. Finally, the most important advantage is that with the concept of 
endogenous technical change, excess capacity represents additional resources 
in producers• hands and therefore additional resources to implement new 
production techniques. Following Mundlak's hypothesis, excess capacity 
influences the producers• capital accumulation process and then influences the 
rate of implementing new techniques {Mundlak, 1988b). The latter influence 
implies that the excess capacity measure should be positively correlated with 
technical change. 
As in the case of the Houch and Ryan variables, the sensitivity of the 
excess capacity quantification is very much in the hands of the researcher. A 
cautionary note in Houck, et al. {1976) referring to the quantification of the PF 
and DP variables, also is relevant to measuring excess capacity, 
In analysis of this kind, much of the potential success hinges 
on the construction, by the researcher, of internally consistent and 
reasonable variables to reflect both price and policy changes. 
Obviously, this places an additional responsibility on the 
investigator as compared with more traditional econometric supply 
response studies. Unfortunately, there is no single method of 
unambiguous approach that emerge from these studies for 
constructing effective support price levels and related variables. 
The general methodology seems appropriate, but the details 
depend upon the commodity and the times . 35 
The quantification method and the commodity groups included in the 
excess capacity variable for this research are the same as those contained in 
Dvoskin.36 Because annual values were computed, a five year moving 
average was introduced in the final computation of the aggregate measure for 
35 Houck et. al. (1976). 
36 For a detailed explanation of the procedure used to quantify or measure excess capacity see 
Dvoskin (1988), pp. 6-10. The commodities included are: wheat, corn, oats, barley, sorghum, 
cotton, soybeans, rye, rice, tobacco, peanuts, and dairy products. 
excess capacity. This average has the purpose of averaging out short run 
variations and allows to use it as a proxy for long run excess capacity. 
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Before moving to other topics, it is necessary to state two important 
shortcomings of excess capacity as an indicator of government intervention. 
First, excess capacity is not independent from research expenditures, and 
therefore some degree of simultaneity is introduced. Secondly, the excess 
capacity measures may not reflect adequately changes in the amount of 
defficiency payments. For the first problem there is no immediate solution but to 
include it in the list of limitations and future challenges of this research. 
Regarding the effect of government payments, a measure of the actual 
payments received by producers can be introduced as means to account for 
changes in the amount of defficiency or diversion payments. 
Lag Structure of Public Supported Agricultural Research 
Agricultural research, as any other research activity, is a long term 
enterprise whose objective is to increase the absolute level of knowledge with 
productive purposes. In other words, the output from agricultural research 
activities increases the set of techniques available for producers. By including 
public research expenditures as a producers technology shifter, two objectives 
are being accomplished. The first is to integrate the research component of 
agricultural policy with the income support features of government intervention. 
Second, public research expenditures are a proxy for the supply of technology. 
Most of the existing literature deals with the estimation of the rate of 
return from public research. A common method used in the literature since 
Griliches (1964) to account for the generation of new technology is to relate 
change in output productivity to the state of technology at time t. The state of 
technology is represented by a lag structure of public expenditures on 
agricultural research. 
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There are several identifiable lag structures in the life span of a research 
activity. According to Griliches (1967) in the process on generating new 
knowledge there are two lag structures. One is the investment period, which 
accounts for the time between the initial investments of funds and the 
appearance of first results. The second lag represents the time between the first 
aapearance of results and a commercial application provided to producers. 
Once a new technique reaches the commercial stage at time t+m, its extension 
begins, and farmers start to adopt it, and accrue its benefits. Then, according to 
Evenson (1968), the implemented technology will depreciate and after n 
periods, it becomes obsolete or irrelevant. The lag structure described above 
means that the total life of a new technique is t+m+n, which is the summation of 
the time spent producing it and the periods in which it was productive. Then 
following Evenson (1968), a total lag structure represented by a inverted V 
shape can be pictured. Most subsequent studies have maintained this form of 
the lag structure. 
The length of the lag varies from one study to the other. While Griliches 
(1964) assumed a six-year lag, Evenson (1968) concluded that the mean lag for 
state-supported research was about five and a half years, while the mean lag 
for federally supported research was eight and a half years. Later in Cline 
(1975), lag lengths between eight and seventeen periods were used. 
The common denominator on these studies is the specification of the 
number of lag periods to consider. The lag length is such that it is usually 
determined by its statistical fit, not by a priori knowledge. In a recent study 
impressive database which included observations on public research 
expenditures for the 1890 -1983 period, Pardey and Craig (1989) performed 
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causality tests of alternative lag lengths. Pardey and Craig concluded that, "the 
evidence indicates that long lags -- at least thirty years -- may be necessary to 
capture all of the impact of research on agricultural output. ".37 
Given the evidence presented above, the lag shape and its length, for 
purposes of this research is considered to have the inverted V shape and to be 
over fifteen periods. Having specified the. public agricultural research lag 
structure to be used and previously the method to incorporate government 
policy effects, what follows is the specification of the remaining technology 
shifter variables. 
Prices as Technology Shifters 
The literature on technical change recognizes the importance of input 
prices in the innovation process. The induced innovation hypothesis is built 
around the idea that relative prices influence the direction of the bias of 
technical change. According to Ruttan and Hayami (1988), " ... it is entirely 
rational for competitive firms to allocate funds to develop a technology that 
facilitates the substitution of increasingly more expensive factors for less 
expensive factors. ".38 Following Binswanger {1978), the induced innovation 
hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between output prices and 
ptoductivity changes. In the context of induced innovation, there is no 
' 
distinction between new technology generation and its adoption process, as 
both are integrated under the umbrella of technological innovation. 
Mundlak {1988), also considers input as well as output prices, as 
technology shifters on the basis that these are the state variables which 
37 Pardey, P.G., and Craig, B. {1989), p.18 
38 Ruttan and Hayami, 1988, p. 250. 
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influence producers adoption decisions. The optimal solution of the producers 
profit-maximization problem depends on the state (exogenous) variables, and it 
(the optimal solution) will determine n ••• both the techniques used and the level 
of their use, as determined by the optimal allocation of fixed inputs ... and 
variable inputs. ''39 
According to Mundlak (1988), data from the observation of the real world 
can only provide information on the techniques which have been implemented. 
This observation implies that the technological structure at a given point in time 
could be considered as ,the collection of the output of past decisions. 
Consequently, if the objective is to represent the current productive structure, 
the relevant prices to consider might include the observation of past input and 
output prices. 
Different price formulations have been used in the endogenous technical 
change literature. For instance, Fawson, Shumway and Bassman (1990) used 
current price observations; and Frisvold {1991) defined two different price 
variables-current prices and a price variable as a moving average on 
observations for four periods, each period representing data in a five-years 
intervals. Finally, Fulginiti and Perrin (1991) used a five-year, moving average 
specification to formulate the relevant price expectations. 
In this research, the price variables are defined in term of moving 
averages on past observations. Contrary to Mundlak (1988) and Frisvold 
(1991), current prices are not included to avoid the 11reswitching .. of technology 
and the functional intract~bility issues discussed early in this chapter. 
39 Mundlak, 1988, p.319. 
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Additional Technology Shifters 
Five other technology shifters are included in the model: nat farm income 
farm income, export share on gross income, total production cost, net farm 
income variability, and weather. From these, farm income is incorporated as a 
source the capital accumulation process. Producers will implement new 
techniques to the point that they can afford or can finance them. As Mundlak 
(1988b) states, modern technologies are view as capital-intensive techniques. 
In general, it is impossible to increase the relative importance of the modern 
techniques without capital accumulation. The above statements signal that the 
discount rate, could be introduce as a proxy variable to account for the 
availability of external (to the farm) financial resources. 
Most technology shifters thus far have implied some long trend 
component. However, there are short-term elements or current events which 
might have a significant impact on the implementation of new techniques. One 
element is the level of exports. Having ruled out current output price 
expectations as a technology variable, there is a need to introduce variables 
which will transmit tothe producer short-run information about the agricultural 
economy's performance. The level of agricultural exports is highly associated 
with output prices. As export demand increases, it puts pressure on the current 
supply and results in an output price increase. Conversely, a reduction in export 
demand or an unusual increase in production will reduce the relative 
importance of agricultural exports, and subsequently lower prices result. The 
impact of these variations and price transmission, is affected only by the degree 
of government intervention. 
The implementation of a new technique, as suggested by Mundlak 
(1988b), implies an investment decision. Therefore the following hypothesis is 
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formulated: the investment decision not only depends, as implied before, on the 
rate of capital accumulation but also on the stability of the capital source. Given 
that the primary capital source is farm income, its variability is considered to be 
an additional technology shifter. An inverse relationship between variability 
and technical change is expected. 
In the literature, there are several measures of variability in the literature, 
which have been used in the context of supply response estimation. Several 
existing formulations can be used indistinctly. In this research, the following 
income variability formulations will be considered: 
A. Behrman (1968) : 
B. Ryan (1977): 
C. Ryan (1977): 
[ 
n ]1/2 













where It is the income level at time t; it represents a moving average on income 
observations; and n indicates the number of relevant past observations. The 
first two measures ( A and B) are standard deviations of income measures; B is 
slightly different due to the introduction of different weights on each lagged 
period. C is a coefficient of variation measure in which weights also are 
introduced. 
Another important variable to account for short-term variations in 
production parameters is weather. Much of the year-to-year differences in 
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productivity are related to changes in performance due to weather pattern 
changes. Cline (1975) found empirical evidence that high variations in weather 
can be associated with lower rates of technology adoption. 
Empirical Model 
Before the empirical model is completely specified, the degree of input 
aggregation should be defined. The sam~ input categories used by the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) have been used, although they have 
been aggregated in four major groups. This classification has been defined 
according to the e~ent to which inputs are fixed or variable in the short and long 
run. These groups and their components are short term variable inputs or 
operating expenses4o , machinery, labor and real estate. 
That said, the full specification of the empirical model is given by the 





40 As it is presented later, the category short-run variable inputs or operating expenses includes 





Y is the agricultural aggregate output level. 
A is a parameter of disembodied technical change. 
X 1, X2, X3, X4 are quantity of inputs applied to production. 
Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 are production parameters and elasticities of production. 
Py is the output price. 
P 1 , P2, P3, P 4 are the corresponding input prices. 
EC is a measure of the aggregate excess capacity in agriculture. 
I is the net farm income. 
EXS is the export share of agricultural products. 
R is the amount of public research expenditures. 
VI stands for income variability. 
GPF government payments share on net farm income 
W is a weather index. 
Fit is the factor share of input i at time t. 
e measures marginal returns and homogeneity of the production function. 
9i represents the elasticity of production respect to the ith. input. 
The estimation procedures, data description and estimation results will 
be presented in the next chapter. In Chapter Six a policy preference function 
will be estimated, based on the estimates obtained and other structural foreign 
and domestic demand parameters taken from previous studies. 
CHAPTER V 
MODEL ESTIMATION AND ANALYSIS 
The previous chapter ended with the presentation of the system of 
equations, which defines the empirical model to be used to accomplish this 
dissertation objectives. What follows are the details concerning the statistical 
procedures used to estimate the parameters of the model, and analysis of the 
results. Specifically, the following sections define the variables and their 
construction, specifiy the estimating methods, present and discuss the statistical 
results, and analyze the results regarding the effects of the technology shifter 
variables in term of elasticities of production and measurement of Hicksian 
technical bias. 
The Model 
First, recall from the previous chapter the structure of the model, 
(5.1) 






The variables are defined as in the previous chapter. A detailed 
explanation of each time series is reserved for the appendix. For now the key is 
to focus on the issues of: inputs classification; factor shares computations; 
definition of price variables; the specification of excess capacity, income, 
research expenditures, total cost, and weather; and the functional form for (5.2) 
and (5.3). 
Output 
The level of output Y is defined as the total value of agricultural production 
(crops and livestock). It is measured in constant dollars, computed by 
aggregating ERS individual commodity groups. The aggregation was performed 
using a Tornquist index. 
Input Classification 
The set of farm inputs was classified in four categories, based on the 
criteria of whether an input can be classified as relatively variable or fixed in the 
short run. The four categories are: 
- X 1: Short-term, variable inputs. This category includes agricultural chemicals; 
machinery operating expenses; feed, seed, and livestock purchases (non-farm 
value added); operating financial expenses, and miscellaneous inputs. 
- X2: Short-term, machinery fixed costs. This category includes non-operating 
costs of machinery. 
- Xs: Farm labor, which includes hired labor, operator labor and family unpaid 
labor. 
- X4: Farm real_ estate. 
As one moves from X1 to X4, the inputs become less (short-term) 
variable. Based on ERS data, the aggregation into four categories was done 
using a Tornquist index, following a similar work done by Fawson and Gottret 
{1988). 
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This classification criterion was chosen based on two facts. First, the 
number of input categories should be reduced to minimize potential 
multicollinearity problems and avoid unnecessary losses of degrees of freedom, 
given the restricted sample size. Secondly, given the use of a Cobb-Douglas 
function and the fact that the corresponding supply elasticity is derived based on 
the production elasticities, the criterion chosen simplifies the aggregation 
procedure as we move from the short run (X 1 ), to the long run (X4). 
Furthermore, as it will be confirmed later, this classification criterion facilitates 
the interpretation of the model results with this endogenous technical change 
framework. 
Factor Shares 
The factor shares (Ft), are nominal factor shares defined as the ratio of 
nominal expenditures on input Xi and the total nominal expenditures. Their 
construction is based on aggregating nominal ERS data on expenditures using a 
Tornquist index. As mentioned earlier this is based on the work of Fawson and 
Gottret (1988). 
Input and Output Prices 
Input and output prices are defined as moving averages of the previous 
five years of observations on the corresponding Tornquist indexes. This moving 
average formulation is consistent with the earlier assertion that the observed 
implemented technology is the result of previous producers decisions based on 
past prices. 
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In the estimation procedure, some relative input prices measures also are 
used. These are computed by first taking the ratio of the two Tornquist input 
index prices and then imposing the moving average formulation. 
Excess Capacity 
As defined earlier, annual observations on excess capacity were 
constructed using the procedure outlined by Dvoskin (1988). For the period 
between 1940 and 1984, the data used is the actual data presented in Dvoskin 
(1988). For the 1985 to 1989 period the series was updated independently using 
the same methodology. 
The observations used in the estimation procedure are five-year, moving 
averages of annual observations. A similar aggregation is suggested by Dvoskin 
using three-and seven-year moving averages to smooth out annual changes in 
stocks and provide a proxy variable for long-run excess capacity41. A five-year, 
moving average proved to be more appropriate. 
One of the limitations of the concept and measurement of excess capacity, 
is its lack of ability to reflect changes in the size of the government payments. 
Suppose the government decides to increase the amount of direct payments, 
without changing the eligibility requirements. If participation is high enough, 
excess capacity will not reflect the increase in government payments. To 
account for this limitation, a new variable defined as the government payments• 
share of net farm income is introduced in the empirical model. 
Income 
Income initially was measured as annual observations on net farm income. 
To account for long-term changes, a polynomial distributed lag formulation was 
41 Dvoskin, D. (1988), p. 10 
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introduced. So unrestricted and restricted Almon distributed lags formulations for 
net income were considered as technology shifters. Given the lack of a priori 
knowledge, in principle the formulation for each equation needs not to be the 
same. 
Research Expenditures 
Research expenditures are defined as the sum of research resources 
allocated to state agricultural experiment stations and to federal agricultural 
agencies. A comprehensive series for the period 1890 to 1986 was taken from 
Pardey (1991 )42. 
Based on what already has been reviewed in Chapter Four, the research 
variable was considered as an Almon polynomial distributed lag. The lag form 
was assumed to have the inverted "V" shape. Consequently, the Almon 
formulation was considered to have both endpoints constrained to zero. Taking 
into account Pardey and Craig's (1989) empirical work, the lag length was 
considered to be between 5 and 30 years. Although it is assumed that the 
inverted .. V" shape is common to all equations, the lag length need not be. 
Total Cost 
Total cost is used as a proxy for scale of production (Fawson, Shumway, 
and Bassman, 1990). It is defined as total real expenditures, which were 
computed as the other production variables, based on a Tornquist index. 
Exports 
This variable is defined as a share equal to the ratio of total value of 
agricultural exports to farm gross income. 
42 Pardey, P.G., W.M. Eveleens, and M.L. Hallaway. "A Statistical History of U.S. Agricultural 
Research: 1889 to 1986.u St. Paul: University of Minnesota, CIFAP, (forthcoming, 1991) 
98 
Weather 
Observations on the weather variables were constructed following 
Stallings• (1960) empirical work. A time trend was run on yields, and the weather 
index is constructed based on the residuals. From the years 1939 to 1963, 
observations were taken as presented in Cline (1970), and for later years, the 
index was estimated using the methodology described in Stallings (1960) but 
using actual yield instead of controlled yields. 
Before finishing with the presentation of the model, the issue of the 
functional form of equations {5.2) and {5.3) must be addressed. There is no a 
priori knowledge about the form of these equations, neither are constraints to any 
particular form, as this is a purely empirical determination. Therefore, for 
simplicity's sake only three alternative functional forms were tried: linear, log-
linear, and logarithmic. The log-linear and the logarithmic, although being the 
most attractive for computing elasticities, were not selected for equation {5.2). 
The linear functional form showed the best fit and more consistency in the 
parameters. As for equation {5.3) the functional form chosen was the log-linear. 
Estimation of The Model 
Based on the information provided in the preceding section and in Chapter 
Four, the complete estimation model is given by, 
n 





LogA = <XoA + L<XkA'Yk 
k=1 
Fit - Fi,t-1 = g(9it - Fi,t-1 ), 





To obtain the estimating equations there are two alternative procedures. 
First, to substitute (5.7), (5.8), and (5.9) into (5.6), one could proceed-to estimate 
the new (5.6) by taking the natural logarithm of Y and using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). However, given the large number of parameters to be estimated 
in a single equation, it is likely that multicollinearity will be a problem. Moreover, 
given a sample size from of 46 years, 1944 to 1989, the number of degrees of 
freedom will be compromised, or it might not be possible even to use OLS if the 
number of parameters is greater than the total number of observations available. 
An alternative estimation procedure is to substitute {5.7) into (5.9). First 
solve {5.9) for the factor share Fi,t 
Fi,t = gei,t + (1- g)Fi,t-1 
then, 
n 





From the estimation of the system of equations in {5.12), the estimates of 
Si can be inserted in {5.6) to obtain, as residuals, observations on LogA. With 
this information, it is possible to estimate LogA equation using OLS and hence 
complete the estimation of the production function parameters in {5.6). 
To summarize, after adding the corresponding stochastic error terms, 
which are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution, the system of 
equations to be estimated in order to get the complete set of parameters for {5.6) 
is given by {5.8) and {5.12). This can be viewed as a recursive system, in which 
equations {5.8) need to be estimated simultaneously, in order to account for the 
variations across factor shares. 
Bearing in mind that not all the independent variables will be included in 
each and everyone of the equations, that is Clik=O for some kin i; and that the 
error terms across equation are contemporaneously correlated, such that the 
variance-covariance matrix for the system is in fact non-singular and non 
diagonal; then it is confirmed that {5.8) is in fact a seemingly unrelated 
regression equations (SURE) model. Consequently, given that by assumption 
the disturbances are normally distributed, using an iterative seemingly unrelated 
regression method will yield parameters numerically equivalent to those of the 
maximum likelihood estimate (ML).43 This result and the fact that OLS is a ML 
estimator provides for estimates of {5.6) with all desirable asymptotic properties. 
At this time, it is should be mentioned that none of the econometric 
software for microcomputers available for this research had the capability of 
estimating polynomial distributed lags (POL) with in the framework of system 
estimation44. Therefore, the POL variables had to be computed independently, 
and then inputted as independent variables. The results to be presented below 
43 For a proof of this result , see Oberhofer and Kmenta (1974). 
44 The software available for estimation included Shazam and Micro TSP 
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show the coefficients and statistics for the POL variables, which were converted 
later on into their correspondence coefficient with in the POL lag structure. 
Estimation Results: Statistical Analysis 
The estimation procedure described above is carried out in two stages. In 
the first, the factor share equations (5.12) are estimated and used to estimate 
short run production elasticities (ei), which in turn are used to compute residual 
observations on LogA. The second stage involves the estimation of equation 
(5.8). This section will be developed by looking first at the statistical support for 
the results, with a few references to economic theory. Next, the focus will be to 
analyze the results based on the concepts of elasticity of production, elasticity of 
the marginal rate of substitution, and of supply elasticity. 
The first stage estimates are presented in TABLE 2. First, looking at the 
aggregate model (5.12), the statistics such as the system R2 and the 
corresponding Chi-square, Breusch-Pagan and likelihood ratio tests, strongly 
support the model formulation and estimation procedures. The Breusch-Pagan 
and the likelihood ratio tests support the presence of a non-diagonal, variance-
covariance matrix; while the system R2 and the Chi-square tests support the fit 
and the statistical significance of the modeJ.45. Regarding the individual 
parameters, it can be observed that from fifty-four (54) parameters estimated, 
thirty nine {39) are significant at the 5 percent level, and forty three when the 
significance level is 10 percent. 46 In summary, the estimated parameters have a 
strong statistical support. 
45 For a complete explanation of the properties of these tests refer to Judge et. al. (1982). For a 
specification of the system R2 refer to Brendt (1991). 
46 Given that the estimator used has good asymptotic properties, the p values on the tables refer 
to the Wald Chi-square statistic. 
TABLE2. 
FACTOR SHARE ESTIMATION RESULTS 
REAL ESTATE . ·LABOR 
Intercept 0.17015 -0.16236 
0.02566(1) 0.17629 
Factor Shafet.1 0.45068 0.24958 
.000000 0.01774 
Price Real. Estate -0.23432 ---(2) 
0.00852 
Price R.EstateNar.lnp. 0.16507 --
0.00689 
Price Labor --- -0.10477 
0.40644 
Price Labor/Fix Inputs · --- -0.05956 
0.57551 
Price Fixed Inputs -- ---
. 
Price Variable Inputs --- --
Price Output o.29n2 0.19521 
0.00003 0.00038 
Excess Capacity 1.0064E-05 · 2.3723E-05 
0.01256 0.00028 
Weather Index -0.0014306 -Q.001435 
0.00001 0.00137 
Research Expend(PDL) 3.5844E·09 -1.279E-07 
0.62057 .000000 
Net Farm lnc.-NFI(PDL) 5.9557E-08 4.5372E-08{3) 
0.00005 0.11233 
Net Farm Income (POL) -- 3.1317E-D8(3) 
0.03114 
Export Share (POL) -0.0016708 0.013057 
0.08351 0.0001 
Total Cost 3.6517E-D7 2.822E-06 
0.57935 0.00256 
Income Variability -0.024163 -0.040947 
0.15894 0.07447 
(Gov. Pay/NFI)t.1 -0.062673 ·0.0076657 
0.00264 0.79335 
Farm Population Share ·- 0.058438 
.000000 
BREUSH-PAGAN TEST CHI-SQUARE 
SYSTEMR2 0.9999 SYSTEM CHI-SQUARE 
(1) Values in italics are p-values on the Wald Chi-Square statistic. 
(2) Indicates that variable does not belong to that equation. 
(3) POL variables with restriction in farther end point only. 








































































The p-values for input prices on the labor share equation indicate that this 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero. The same is true for the own 
price coefficient on the real estate share equation. The outptut price variable is 
highly significant across equations. 
For the case of the government intervention shifters, research 
expenditures is significant in all but the share of labor equation; excess capacity 
is highly siginificant across equations; and the government payments share of net 
farm income is highly significant in all but the labor share equation. 
The low significance of some key coefficients in the labor share equation--
input prices, research expenditures, government payments share -- might be due 
to the measurement definition of labor expenditures. According to a USDA-ERS 
report, farm labor includes the estimated total hours of hired and unpaid operator 
and family labor used in agricultural production.47 This definition of labor does 
not provide information about the existence of excess labor in the form of family 
labor. Consequently, due to the low significance of these coeffcients, caution 
must be taken when analyzing the implications of these variables. 
Despite the fact that there is not a theory of factor shares, it can be argued 
from what has been discussed in previous chapters that the parameter signs are 
as expected, with a few exceptions. In the real estate and variable input 
equations, the signs of the ratio of prices have the reversed signs. This could be 
due to two factors: the first due to input aggregation, and the second, as 
suggested by Frisvold (1991 ), due to the limited short-run substitution 
possibilities between this two input groups. 
Other variables which might appear to have the reversed signs in all input 
equations are income, exports, and the government payments share of net 
47 USDA, ERS, "Major Statistical Series of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 
Production and efficiency." Agricultural Handbook No. 671, Volume 2. October 1989. p.9. 
104 
income. All of these variables are related to capital accumulation. The discussion 
of these issues will be developed immediately after the estimates for ei are 
presented, specifically when analyzing the elasticities of production with respect 
to the technology shifters. In this way, the analysis will become more apparent as 
it is related to the productivity issue. 
On TABLE 3, the results for the complete model and consequently for the 
production function in {5.6) are presented. It includes the four equations which 
encompass the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas and the equation corresponding 
to the intercept. The system statistics, for the four short-run, input elasticity of 
production equations, are carried out, given that the parameters for the qi have 
been computed directly from TABLE 2. According to the formulation in {5.11) and 
{5.12), the parameters of ei are obtained by multiplying the parameters on Fi,t. by 
the inverse of the rate of adjustment, which is defined as one minus the 
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable. 
Estimation Results: Economic Analysis 
As in the case of the original estimates, TABLE 3's p-values are provided 
for each of the coefficients in the five equations. From the sixty four (64) 
coefficients, forty eight (48) are significant at the 5 percent level; the number 
increases to fifty two {52) if the level of significance is 10 percent. The equation 
for LogA was estimated assuming a second-degree order of auto-correlated 
disturbances, and the corresponding statistics also are presented. As in the case 
of the first stage results, most signs appear to have the right theoretical sign, 
except for the cases already identified. 
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TABLE 3. 
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION FUNCTION PARAMETERS 
ReAL EsTATE lABOR fiXED VARIABLE INTERCEPT(2) 
Intercept 0.3097466 -0.2163588 0.4675455 0.40779561 -1.8613 
.02325 .19709 .00006 .00851 .21251 
Price Real Estate -0.4265638 6.6154 
.01599 .00000 
Price R.EstJVar.lnp. 0.3004988 -0.0988677 
.01553 .20600 
Price Labor -0.1396151 1.5618 
.41016 .10181 
Price Labor/FiX.Inp. -0.0793689 0.07222191 
.57365 .00937 
Price Fixed Inputs -0.6798871 9.4994 
.00000 .01081 
Price Variable Input~ -0.2349058 -3.3121 
.01505 .08417 
Price Output 0.54197917 0.26013432 0.46763964 0.32383946 -16.052 
.00034 .00014 .00000 .00128 .00000 
Excess Capacity 1.8321 E-05 3.1613E-05 1.2916E-05 2.1027E-05 -0.0007296 
.00920 .00205 .01726 .00067 .00000 
Weather Index -o.0026043 -0.0019123 -0.0021052 -0.0022515 0.093652 
.00022 .00751 .00004 .00014 .00000 
Research Exp. (1) -3.236E-05 0.00084537 0.00022888 7.9615E-05 -o.0109254 
.62086 .00000 .00157 .04784 .00000 
Net Farm lncome(1) -1.301E-05 -4.872E-06 -1.508E-05 -6.161 E-06 0.0003921 
.00054 .00000 .01907 .00000 
Export Share(1) 0.36498944 -2.0879507 0.70810842 0.3559452 7.71516 
.09008 .00000 .00000 .00001 .03688 
Total Cost 6.6477E-07 3.7606E-06 1.4741 E-06 1.3665E-06 -6.911E-05 
.57953 .00914 .09012 .15535 .00000 
Income Variability -o.0439871 -0.0545654 -0.0351421 -0.020071 1.3079 
.15798 .07025 .13854 .44473 .00000 
(Gov.PayJNFI>t-1 -0.114092 -0.0102152 -0.1314317 -0.0715304 3.5976 
.01020 .79259 .00009 .03186 .00000 
Farm Pop. Share 0.07787372 
.00000 
(1) Coefficients shown correspond to the sum of PDL lagged coefficients. 
(2) In the estimation of equation LogA, the following statistics were obatined: R2=.9850, 
RH01= .83269 (6.0141); RH02=-.34377 (-2.48287). Number in parenthesis are t-values. 
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The next table, TABLE 4, presents the values of the elasticity of 
production with respect to changes in the technology shifters; these parameters 
also are called elasticity of productivity. The input price coefficients indicate that 
increases in the prices of real estate and machinery {short-run fixed costs), lead 
to productivity increases, while an increase in the price of variable inputs 
(fertilizers, energy, seed, feed and livestock) leads to a downward shift in the 
production function. The elasticity with respect to the price of labor, although 
negative, is almost zero. The direction of production shifts due to changes in real 
estate and variable inputs is consistent with the induced innovation hypothesis. 
The contrary is concluded from the direction of the shift due to a change in the 
price of machinery. 
The sign of the elasticity with respect to output price is in contradiction with 
the induced innovation hypothesis. However, from the results of TABLE 3, it can 
be observed that the output price effect shows a consistent behavior; it is the 
large influence from the intercept equation which changes the direction of the 
total effect. The following is a strict interpretation of these signs: an increase in 
output price shifts the production function upward by increasing the intensity of 
input use and downward by deinvesting in disembodied technical change. 
An alternative hypothesis to explain the sign of the production elasticy with 
respect to output price might be that as output price decreases, the incentives for 
innovation increases due to the fact that producer survival is threatened. The 
source of this hypothesis is Hicks (1935) and Leibenstein {1973) and 
paradoxically was developed for the case of increased competition in 
monopolistic markets. 
A hypothesis closer to agriculture is Cochrane•s {1958) treadmill theory, 
which states as new technology is adopted, supply shifts to the right at a higher 
pace than demand driving farm prices down. Late adopters have either to adopt 
TABLE 4. 
ELASTICITIES OF PRODUCTION WITH RESPECT TO 
TECHNOLOGY SHIFTERS 
. TECHNOLOGY SHIFTER EL~STICITY OF PRODUCTION 
Quantity of Real Estate 0.27179952 
Quantity of Labor 0.27288087 
-
Quantity of Fixed Inputs ' 0.17016959 
Quantity of Variable Inputs 0.28506927 
Price of Real Estate 3.81651132 
Price of Labor ·2.302E-05 
Price of Fixed Inputs 2.58610774 
Price of Variable Inputs -7.9897437 
Price of Output -0.3624875 
Excess Capacity 0.36139947 
Weather Index 0.52373376 
Research Expenditures 0.1~85915 
Net Farm Income 0.15563773 
El,(port· Share · 0.093869~5 
-
' 
Total Cost 0.303396 
Income Variability -0.277837 
(Gov. ·payments/NFI}t-1 ' 0.05074036 
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or go out of business. Thus generalized adoption occurs in a context of falling 
farm output prices. 
All three government intervention variables, excess capacity, research 
expenditures and the share of government payments on net farm income show a 
positive effect on productivity. This supports the hypothesis that government 
programs have had a positive impact on the process of technology adoption. 
The estimate of elasticity of production with respect to research is relatively high 
compared to similar estimates. Cline (1970) estimated an elasticity of .037 for 
the agricultural sector, and Norton (1981) obtained values of public research 
production elasticities of .1 05 for cash grain production, .056 for dairy, .022 for 
poultry and .153 for the case of livestock. However, neither of these studies 
accounted for the effects of public policies other than research. Hence, the 
relatively high production elasticity obtained .182, could be the result of 
accounting for any positive contribution of government programs to technology 
adoption in agriculture. 
The effect of net farm income and export share appears to be consistent 
with Mundlak•s capital accumulation framework described early in Chapter Two. 
The effect of total expenditures, a proxy for scale, also is positive and consistent 
with Fawson,Shumway, and Bassman (1990). The sign of the coefficient of 
variability is as expected, while the effect of weather is not; observe that weather 
has the expected negative sign in the input equations, as shown in TABLE 3, 
while a large positive value on the intercept equation dominates the total effect. 
The elasticities of the marginal rates of substitution with respect to the 
technology shifters are presented in TABLE 5. Although the direct and intuitive 
interpretation of the MRTS in a world with more than two inputs is not straight 
foreward, it can be confirmed that research expenditures impact all marginal 
rates. Excess capacity and the government payments variables also have a 
TECHNOLOGY 
SHIFTER 
Price of Real Est; 
Price of Labor 
Price of Fix. lnp.-
Price of Var. lnp. 









Farm Pop. Share 
TABLE 5. 
ELASTICITIES OF MARGINAL RATES OF 
TECHNICAL SUBSTITUTION (MATS) 
MATS MAT$ MATS -MATS MATS 
R.E.x Labor R.E.xFixed RExVariable LaborxFixec LaborxVar. 
-0.50805 -0.50805 -0.12130 0.00000 0.38675 
0.63918 -0.06374 0.00000 -0.70292 -0.63918 
-0.25670 2.99699 0.00000 3.25368 0.25670 
-0.93578 -0.93578 -0.31042 0.00000 0.62536 
1.29042 -0.86206 1.06387 -2.15248 -0.22654 
-0.15631 -0.02741 -0.02051 0.12890 0.13580 
-0.26242 0.28440 -0.17166 0.54683 0.09076 
-1.53353 -0.69791 -0.18989 0.83562 1.34363 
:.o.89834 1.20722 -0.77813 2.10556 0.12022 
1.91302 -0.16118 0.13932 -2.07419 -1.77370 
-0.89824 -0.49265 -0.18604 0.40559 0.71220 
0.04571 0.05357 -0.10962 0.00786 -0.15533 
-0.05340 0.04925 -0.02358 0.10265 0.02982 



















significant impact on the substitution of labor and machinery and between labor 
and variable inputs. The scale variable, represented by total cost also has a 
significant impact across input combinations. While the impact of output price is 
strong across input combinations, the impact of input prices is constrained by 
the model to the input's own price and the price of its closest substitute. 
A more direct way to gauge the elasticity of marginal rates of substitution 
with respect to the technology shifters is through the measure of technical bias 
suggested by Antle (1988) and Antle and Capalbo (1988) and that used by 
Fawson, Shumw~y. and Bassman (1 ~90). 48 They define a primal measure of 
Hicksian bias for input i with respect to technology shifter h at given input levels 
as the following: 
{5.13) 
where Sj is the jth input's cost share, fi is the elasticity of production with respect 
to the ith input qi, and 'Yk the kth technology shifter. The sign of the parameter Bi 
indicates the direction of the technical change bias. It would be neutral, factor 
saving or factor-using if Bi is equal, less or greater than zero. The estimated 
average values for these measures of bias are presented in TABLE 6. 
The direction of the parameters on TABLE 6 show that the bias effect due 
to research expenditures is against real estate and variable inputs and toward 
labor and machinery. For the case of labor and variable inputs, this result 
contradicts the dominant literature, which indicates that technical change is labor 
saving and fertilizer using. Here, it is necesary to bear in mind that the definition 
of research expenditures used is based on an aggregate basis without 
48 The definition of this measurement of bias can be found in Antle (1988), p.357, and Antle and 
Capalbo (1988), pp.38-39. This measure was estimated by Fawson, Shumway and Bassman 
(1990), pp.195-195, for the case of the northeastern region. 
TABLE 6 
AVERAGE SHARE-WEIGHTED SUMMARY MEASURES 
OF HICKSIAN BIAS 
TECHNOLOGY REAL LABOR FIXED VARIABLE 
SHIFTER ESTATE INPliTS INPliTS 
Price of Real Est. -0.2593329 0.24716858 0.24716858 -0.1384008 
Price of Labor 0.16442316 -0.4728019 0.22796832 0.16442316 
Price of Fix. Inputs 0.43538922 0.6913013 -2.5524369 0.43538922 
Price of Var.lnputs -0.5023027 0.43061689 0.43061689 -0.1928276 
Price of Output 0.50951017 -0.776963 1.36893972 -0.5511105 
Excess Capacity -0.0532757 0.10255896 -0.0259469 -0.0328272 
Weather Index -0.072549 0.18907377 -0.3560847 0.09858846 
Research Exp. -0.591848 0.9369903 0.10392782 -0.402535 
Net Farm Income -0.2628784 0.63271986 -1.466406 0.51286883 
Export Share 0.53656068 -1.3706106 0.69724342 0.39766711 
Total Cost -0.3820075 0.51348818 0.10914145 -0.1965376 
Inc. Variability -0.0094812 -0.0550515 -0.062883 0.09980558 
(Gov.Pay JNFI)t-1 -0.0130047 0.04023434 -0.0621026 0.0105064 
Farm Pop. Share -0.269157 0.70991746 -0.269157 -0.269157 
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distinguishing the purpose of the research. Hence, it might not be surprising that 
the direction of the bias due to research does not agree with the literature. 
Notice that all three government intervention variables indicate a labor 
using technical change. This can be interpreted as if government policies have 
made feasible a slower adjustment in farm labor. The effect of exports is showed 
to be labor-saving and toward the other inputs; this could be a reflection that 
when an export expansion occurs, farmers put more acreage in production, using 
more machinery services, and increasing the use variable inputs. On the other 
hand, the relative importance of labor decreases because its application does not 
have to relatively increase as much, due to the possible existence of .. excess .. 
labor. 
Thus far, the results have been analyzed, emphasizing the effects of 
government intervention on technological change. It is apparent from the 
analysis that there is strong evidence to support the hypothesis that policy 
mechanisms have consistently supported the technological process in the 
agricultural sector. In the remainder of this chapter, the attention will be focused 
on the producers response coefficients. 
Recall that for a Cobb-Douglas production function in which the production 
parameters are constant, or are not a function of contemporaneous output price, 
the short-run supply is given by the expression in (4.15). 49 For these elasticities 
to have practical value, they must be related to the length of time required by an 
input to be varied. The total output elasticity e is defined as ~i. The range on 
the summation operator i, indicates the time frame of the supply elasticity. If i 
includes all inputs, it means that all are assumed variable, hence a long-run 
supply elasticity. On the contrary, if i is equal to one (variable inputs), it would 
represent a short-run parameter. It must be taken into account that the Cobb-
49 The expression in (4.15) was defined as 
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Douglas derived-supply elasticities are the maximum potential response and 
overestimate the true response, but the proportion of increase in intermediate 
and succeeding lengths of run may not be significantly affected. 5o The latter 
summarizes one of the chief empirical shortcomings when estimating supply 
response from a Cobb-Douglas production function. However, keep in mind that 
the relative changes are significant. 
That said, the analysis that follows focused on the short and intermediate 
terms; that is, when only "variable" inputs are variable (short-run), and when in 
addition machinery is also variable (intermediate-run). The short-run is 
considered to last between one and two productive periods, and the intermediate 
run will imply between three and five years. The implications of longer term 
variations are of lesser importance due to the fact that, because of changes in 
short-run variables, the changes implied are unlikely to occur {Tyner and 
Tweeten,1967). 
If the supply elasticity is defined as (4.15), then the following concept of 
elasticity of the supply elasticity with respect to technology shifters, can be easily 
derived: 
(5.14) 
where in the short-run case i equals one (VR), and for the intermediate term i is 
equal to two (VR and FX). 
The expression in {5.14) now represents a function of supply elasticity. 
Therefore, (5.14) indicates the sensibility of the elasticity function with respect to 
technology shifter parameters. This is in fact one of the peculiarities of the 
50 Tyner and Tweeten (1966), p. 628. 
endogenous technology approach, the elasticity is function of the structure of 
technology represented by the technology shifter variables in TABLE 7. 
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Looking at the direction and relative size of the coefficients, the agricultural 
supply elasticity appears to be strongly positively (more elastic) influenced by 
changes in output prices (long-term tendency), changes in the share of exports, 
and in the total cost. On the other. hand, changes in income (long term tendency) 
and in weather have a strong negative (more inelastic) effect. The change in 
excess capacity and in government payments show an opposite effect. While the 
effect of research expenditures is as expected, small for short periods and 
towards a more elastic supply. 
Regarding the supply elasticity, the short run average was estimated to be 
.40 while the intermediate term .87. The value of the short-run parameter, 
although relatively high, is consistent with similar studies using a Cobb-Douglas; 
Griliches (1959) estimated .28 for the short run, and Tyner and Tweeten (1966) 
estimates were .45 and .84 for the short and intermediate run respectively. 
These research supply elasticities also are consistent with more recent studies 
which emphasize on technology issues. In Weaver (1983) the estimated supply 
elasticities were between .4 and .73; Shumway (1983) produced estimates 
ranging from .25 to .72; finally Antle (1984) estimated a coefficient for the supply 
elasticity equal to .427. None of the last three studies employed a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The size of the coefficients and supply elasticities on TABLE 
7 are relatively large, which might indicate that the use of a Cobb-Douglas 
function within an endogenous technology still needs more improvement in its 
producers response estimation. 
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TABLE 7 
ELASTICITIES OF THE SUPPLY RESPONSE FUNCTION 
TECHNOLOGY SHIFTER SHORT RUN INTERMEDIATE 
Price of Output 4.94097 3.90711 
Excess Capacity 0.83492 0.44164 
Weather Index -2.82456 -1.79102 
Research Exp. 0.01731 0.02571 
Net Farm Income -1.66095 -0.64309 
Export Share 1.56541 0.62904 
Total Cost 1.33249 0.90768 
Inc. Variability -0.29613 -0.26694 
(Gov.Pay.JNFI)t.1 -0.12294 -0.11431 
TQTAI., OWM-PBICE, 
MEAN 0.40275 0.86981 
STD DEV. 0.07542 0.25758 
CHAPTER VI 
A POLICY PREFERENCE FUNCTION FOR 
U.S. AGRICULTURE 
The objective of this chapter is to estimate the relative weights of the 
economic agents in the agricultural sector; namely farm producers, consumers 
and the taxpayers. Beyond estimating relative weights, this chapter will examine 
at the changes of those weights across time. ·This chapter is based upon the 
work of Oehmke and Yao (1990) and of Oehmke and Choe (1991). These two 
studies were presented in Chapter Two of the dissertation. This chapter is an 
extension of Oehmke•s analysis regarding the time path of the changes in the 
weights, and the level of aggregation. The previously referenced works 
estimated policy-preferences weights for the cases of wheat, and wheat and 
corn, respectively. 
The Policy Preference Function 
The dominant methodology to assess the economic consequences of 
government market intervention is applied welfare economics. As presented in 
Chapter Two, it involves the measurement and comparison of changes in 
consumers• and producers• surpluses and in taxpayers costs, as well as the 
identification and measurement of any losses in social economic efficiency. 
There are two traditional assumptions. First, one dollar for consumers is 
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equivalent to one dollar for producers or taxpayers. Secondly, there are no 
preference among the competing economic interests of three groups: consumers, 
producers, and taxpayers. The former assumptions underline the concept that 
public policy is neutral in term of preferences and that no economic interest 
exercises influence over government policies. 
The policy preference function approach is based on Peltzman and Becker 
views on interest-group competition for political influence and in Buchanan's and 
Tullock's Public Choice line of thought. Government policy is viewed as the 
result of a bargaining process between interest groups, and government policies 
are introduced to transfer wealth from one group in society to another. The 
government, in this view, is seen purely as a mechanism to transfer wealth, not 
as an autonomous neutral entity. Powerful interest groups seeking their own 
benefit manipulate public policies in their behalf. Hence, the policy process 
becomes a competition among interest groups to dictate the design and 
implementation of government policies. 
Two different approaches to define a policy preference function can be 
identified, one in which all economic interests are arguments of the objective 
function but corresponding to each group a different weight. The function then is 
maximized in an unconstrained fashion. 
On the other hand, one can conceptualize a policy preference function 
which represents the objectives of the dominant or triumphant interest group. 
This function then could be maximized in a constrained framework, in which the 
interests of competing groups will represent the constraints in the maximization 
process. Regardless of the specification of the preference function, both 
approaches depart from the traditional idea that the government is an 
independent autonomous entity. 
118 
In summary, the government•s policy preference function is a 
representation of the different interest groups involved in the bargaining or 
competitive process referred above. Previous empirical studies developed in the 
agricultural economics literature by Rausser and Freebairn (1974) and by 
Oehmke and collaborators can be considered as following closer the ideas of 
Becker and Peltzman. The function arguments are indicators of each group•s 
objectives, and specifically in Oehmke•s studies, the arguments are consumer 
surplus, producer ~urplus and government costs, all of which represent the 
interests of farm producers, consumers and taxpayers respectively. The specific 
representation is given by the following function: 
00 
V(PS, CS, GE) = L v( (01t~PSt ,ro2t~cst' (01t~GEt) 
t=O 
(6.1) 
where APS represents change in producers• surplus, ACS change in consumers• 
surplus and AGE denotes change in government costs. Each of the COit 
parameters represent the weight each interest group•s objectives have in the 
government policy preference function. From the first order conditions of the 
maximization of (6.1) with respect to the choice of policy instrument will provide 
enough information to estimate the relative weights of each of the three interest 
groups. 
Model Specification 
The objective is to estimate the evolution of the implicit relative policy 
weights on the policy preference function for government intervention in the U.S. 
agricultural sector, for the period 1945 to 1989. In order to obtain some 
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consistency in the policies implemented for such a period, the following set of 
simplifying assumptions are made. There are only two kind of policy instruments, 
public research expenditures which shift the supply function to the right and a 
support policy which increases the price producers receive. Producers must 
comply with acreage reduction requirements in order to receive the support price. 
Then, the impact of these price support programs is to shift the supply inwards. It 
is assumed that the government holds no inventories, or that the cost of its 
inventories is smal.l (in this case the cost is assumed to be zero). Also, it is 
assumed that government policies do not affect the demand or the effects 
showed are net of demand changes. 
The effects of these policy instruments within the context of an open 
economy can be viewed in Figure 7, where D represents the domestic demand, 
S the supply curve in the pre-intervention period, and ED and ES the excess 
demand and excess supply in the pre-intervention period. When the research 
policy is implemented, the supply shifts to S', causing a similar shift in ES toES' 
and consequently a drop in the market price from Po to P1. Then, the support 
price is implemented and, due to acreage restrictions, shifts the supply 
backwards from S' to 8 11 • Consequently, ES' shifts toES .. , and the price 
increases from P1 to P3. At a price level PNP below the support price P5 , 
producers might be indifferent to participate in the support program. Therefore, a 
kink occurs in the supply curve ES ... To evaluate the welfare changes, the 
situations pre-intervention and post-intervention are compared, and this implies 
supply curves S and S". 
To keep the analysis simple, assume that the agricultural sector can be 
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The supply function is given by {6.2), where a is the supply shifter and a is the 
' 
supply eslaticity. In turn, the supply shifter is defined by equation (6.5) as a 
function of research expenditures (R), and the elasticity of supply with respect to 
research (p). Expressions (6.3) and (6.4), are the domestic and excess demand 
functions respectively. Variables d and k are function shifters, and B and E are 
the corresponding elasticities of demand. The market equilibrium condition is 
given by: 
(6.6) 
Given the above expressions and the information provided in figure 7, the 
following changes in welfare can be defined: 
Po 
L\CS = J dP-o aP or area efji (6. 7) 
Pa 
Ps Ps 
L\PS = J bPerap + J[bRPper - bPer ]dP or areas abg'Ps +cOd (6.8) 
P0 0 
Ps S(Ps) 
I p era I s1/er as ~GE = bR P P + 11er per 
b R 
Pa S(P3) 
or areas abki + bdml (6.9) 
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The actual evaluation of the above expressions will give an approximate 
measure of the welfare changes for each interest groups. But they will not 
provide information about the relative weight of each group within the agricultural 
policy formulated in the last fifty years, which is this chapter's goal. 
The three expressions above .(6. 7 through 6.9) represent each valid 
criteria to account for the particular interests of each group. Therefore, if the 
policy preference function in (6.1) is assumed to be linear, and the measurement 
of changes in welfare are valid representations of the objectives of each group, 
then the following policy.preference function can be specified: 
(6.10) 
where ro1t, Ol2t and mat. represent the relative weights of each interest group within 
the government's objective function in the period t. The maximization of (6.1 0) 
with respect to the policy variables price support (Ps) and public financed 
research (R) will provide a system of first order conditions from which the values 
for the ro's can be obtained by solving simultaneously the system. The solution of 
this system of equations is presented in Oehmke and Chan Choe (1991), and it is 
given by the following expressions: 
ro1t _ s: 1 o k p8-2 ---u- +-+- 3 
roat Pa d 
Ol2t 0' - = -(cr+1)--
roat P s 
Where each of the variables and parameters are as defined earlier. 
(6.11) 
(6.12) 
The expression in (6.11) gives the relative weight of consumers to 
taxpayers, while the next equation indicates the relative weight place on 
producers relative to taxpayers. Providing values for the parameters of the 
model of the agricultural sector given in (6.2-6.5) allow for a direct estimation 
(computation) of the weights by replacing the values of the parameters in 
equations (6.11) and (6.12). 
Parameters Specification 
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There are four parameters which need to be specified in order to 
completely define the model in (6.2- 6.5). These are the supply elasticity, the 
elasticity of supply with respect to research, the domestic demand elasticity and 
the export demand elasticity. Based on these parameters and the data on supply 
and utilization, the corresponding shifting parameters (a, b, d, and k) can be 
defined and the policy weights estimated. 
The parameters for the supply elasticity (cr) and for the elasticity of supply 
with respect to research (p) will be derived from the estimates obtained in the 
previous chapter, while the demand elasticity parameters, domestic and foreign, 
will be taken from estimates presented in the literature. 
From previous analysis, it is already known that the short term supply 
elasticity in"a functional form of the Cobb-Douglas family, as the one defined in 
chapters four and five, is computed based on the inputs which are consider to be 
variable inputs in the short run. This classification conveniently corresponds to 
one of the four input groups defined earlier. The value of the elasticity is given by 




1- 9vR. (6.13) 
Given that evR. as well as the other elasticities of production with respect 
to inputs, is a function and not a fixed param~ter, the expression on (6.13) 
represents a function of the short-run elasticity for which the parameters are the 
technology shifters defined in the previous chapters. This elasticity function 
offers one key advantage and represents ,a big chall~nge. The advantage is that 
the elasticity of supply need not to b~ fixed. across time. In fact, the function 
provides estimates for all periods in the sample. The challenge, has to do with 
the determination of the elasticity of supply with respect to research · 
expenditures. 
Previous studies by Oehmke wrongly have used the elasticity of 
production with respect to research as a an equivalent of the corresponding 
) 
supply elasticity. They have not provided a true elasticity value for this variable 
because they had lacked the means to estimate them. In t~is research, a way to 
provide that true elasticity value exists. The problem, however, is to come up 
with the appropiate way to compute the true elasticity of supply with respect to 
research. The following paragraphs explain this in detail. 
For a Cobb-Douglas function the supply function is given by: 
e 
S = Ar(ArP)1-e 




where wi represent input prices, and the other variables are as usual. Throughout 
out the empirical sections of this research, the value of n has been equatted to 
four. 
It can be directly observed that (6.14) is a function of the 6i's, among other 
variables, and consequently also is a function of R. Therefore, a first alternative 
to calculate the elasticity of supply with respect to research expenditures is 
directly to derived from (6.14 ). However, there are some questions which may 
invalidate this method. If the objective is to compute the short term elasticity, 
should the elasticity be estimated taking into account all four input categories for 
the first lag coefficient in all? Should it be estimated taking into account only the 
variable input? After all, the objective is the short-run parameter. If only the input 
variable is considered, should only the first lag be included, or the full lag 
structure should be taken in consideration? The questions themselves are 
confusing, and the answers may be as well. 
A second method to come up with an estimate for the short-run supply 
elasticity with respect to research first considers the full value of the relevant 6i, in 
this case evA· Then, consider the same qi but assume no impact of research 
expenditures; that is, assume <X.i =0 for all Rt-n. Next, compare the two values as 
in the expression below: 
(6.16) 
Where,O"NR is thee supply elasticity (price) assuming that the coefficients on R 
are zero; p is the supply elasticity with respect to research, o is the full supp;y 
price elasticity. 
The short-run supply elasticity with respect to research would be the ratio 
between one plus the partial elasticity (1+0"NR). and the impact of the total price 
126 
elasticity of research (1 +0' ). Some of the same questions raised before apply to 
this formulation. This formulation has an advantage in that it deals with an 
already defined price elasticity of supply. Given that it is in a short-run 
formulation, there should be no concerns regarding the number of lags to be 
included in the formulation. Given this fact and the ease of computation, this 
formulation was selected to estimate. the P?licy weights defined above. 
Regarding the demand parameters, the literature is inconclusive about the 
size of the demand elasticities, although ari original study by Tweeten (1967) 
estimated aggregate domestic and foreign demand elasticities as weighted 
average of commodity elasticities. He found that the short run elasticity of supply 
was -.25 while th~ export demand was above -6.0 for the long run. Later, Paul 
Johnson (1977) criticized Tweeten•s method, but replicated his estimates. More 
recently, Barclay (1986) estimated domestic and export aggregate demands 
within the context of a macroeconomic general equilibrium model. Barclay 
estimated -. 1 0 for the domestic demand and -1.1 0 for the export demand 
elasticity. Due to the lack of relevant estimates, the values of -.25 and -1.10 are 
chosen as those which better approximate the possible true values. 
All parameters involved in the computation of the policy weights are 
presented in the appendix, as are the data from prices and production, and 
indexes resulting from an aggregation of ERS data on specific commodities. The 
export data is expressed in GOnstant dollars and was extracted from various 
issues of Agricultural Statistics.· 
Results 
The estimated policy weights are presented on TABLE 8 and Figure 8. 
The estimates show that both consumers' and producers• surpluses have weights 
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above the taxpayers; being producers• weight larger that consumers,. While the 
relative weight of producers tends to be stable, it has increased in the last 
decade. Thus, the gap between consumer and producer weights is growing. 
The significative decrease in the relative importance of consumers• surplus 
in the last decade, might be an indication of the reduction in the public research 
programs due to federal budget pressures. The decrease in consumers• relative 
importance in the government policy preference function may be due to two 
reasons. First the relatively small share of income spent on food induces 
consumers to reduce the priority of agriculture in their agendas. Second, the fact 
that due to their numbers, consumers are not able always to effectively organize. 
On the other hand, producers place a high priority in transfers from the 
government, are relatively small in number, and geographically concentrated. 
Therefore, with their relative high organizational ability, they are therefore able to 
exercise political pressure as a group. 
The same weights were computed a second time time assuming 
alternative values for export demand and domestic demand. In neither case did 
a significant change occur, although it was observed that as export demand 
becomes less elastic, the relative weights of consumers increased. Conversely 
as domestic demand becomes less inelastic, consumers weight increases. 
' ' 
One moral from the above results is that as long as the federal budget 
allowed, both consumers and producers benefited from taxpayers. During times 
of fiscal budget pressures, producers were able to defend their relative position 
while consumers lost ground, perhaps due to their double role as consumers and 
taxpayers. Given that consumers are the primary beneficiaries from research, 
public research budgets might continue to get some downward pressure as long 
as consumers do not "feel" the need to regain their relative position in the 
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TABLE 8 
ESTIMATED RELATIVE POLICY WEIGHTS 
YEAR -w1/w3 -w21w3 
1946 1.261203 1.4142754 
1947 1.2754301 1.4434528 
1948 1.2844746 1.3972367 
1949 1.310525 1.5478346 
1950. 1.2867156 1.4766191 
1951 1.2848691 1.4647356 
1952 1.3292562 1.5211347 
1953 1.3288524 1.529112 
1954 1.3220971 1.5465167 
1955 1.3179278 1.5912517 
1956 1.267704 1.7808959 
1957 1.3075959 1.5938565 
1958 1.332538 1.4727382 
1959 1.3040422 1.656276 
1960 1.2932153 1.5938058 
1961 1.2889254 1.6419018 
1962 1.2953811 1.6900711 
1963 1.2593573 1.6589173 
1964 1.2554936 1.7137097 
1965 1.2756882 1.6824356 
1966 1.2582514 1.6849101 
1967 1.2690229 1.6943837 
1968 1.2964202 1.6575722 
1969 1.3289263 1.6124296 
1970 1.3033162 1.6505744 
1971 1.2949939 1.6279728 
1972 1.2971073 1.522923 
1973 1.2344684 1.4521067 
1974 0.946437 1.6634681 
1975 1.137098 1.6610298 
1976 1.1267558 1.6904279 
1977 1.1066555 1.6960226 
1978 1.1076933 1.6214518 
1979 1.1299668 1.5176996 
1980 1.0028707 1.7051259 
1981 1.0471755 1.7181683 
1982 1.0954313 1.7501679 
1983 1.0577367 1.8834258 
1984 1.1018649 1.8107851 
1985 1.183855 1.8234187 
1986 1.2166209 1.8068126 
1987 1.1909358 1.6641409 
1988 1.0474306 1.8084728 
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government agricultural policy preference function. According to Oehmke and 
Yao (1990}, the funding for research is below its efficiency level, and because the 
low value placed on consumer benefits, the government will continue to 
underfund agricultural research. As long as fiscal pressures persists, farm 
producers must have to continue to be effective lobbyists in order to defend their 
relative and absolute position in view of the increasing need for reduced 
government expenditures. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research explicitly recognizes the interdependence between 
income support and public research policies in agriculture and, consequently, 
integrates those two sets of policies in the estimation of supply response 
parameters. The specific objectives of this study as specified in the introduction 
were the following: 
1. To assess the relative size of net benefits to agriculture, and their 
distribution among farm and non-farm groups, from the policies described above. 
2. To develop elasticity functions useful to describe the changes in the 
elasticity parameters across time, due to the adoption of new technology. 
3. To determine the characteristics of the interaction between farm 
programs and public research policy in fostering technical change. 
4. To estimate an aggregate government Policy Preference Function for 
the agricultural sector. 
In order to address the objectives above, this study was organized in an 
introduction and five chapters. A brief summary of each chapter is presented 
below. 
The literature reviewed in Chapter II documents the background for three 
key issues in this research: the policy analysis framework upon which this 
research is based, the endogenous technical approach, and the economics of 
technical change in agriculture. 
131 
132 
A body of literature supports the relevance of applied classical welfare 
economics as a method for evaluating social effects of public policies. This 
literature acknowledges the limitations of welfare economics and provides 
guidelines to overcome these shortcomings when dealing with equity and 
distribution effects and subjective interpersonal comparisons. Additionally, based 
on Rausser's theoretical contribution, a policy preference function (PPF) is 
hypothesized to be an empirical, tractable representation of the relative weights 
assigned by policy makers to the different interests affected by the implemented 
public policy. The PPF recognizes the subjective character of government policy. 
Previous research on the simultaneous analysis of public research and 
producers' support policies advocates applied welfare economics as a valid tool. 
But most findings are restricted by shortcomings of the supply relationship. A 
common problem with previous studies is the estimation of supply function and 
price elasticities without allowing for interaction between public research 
programs and direct government intervention. This synergism is precisely the 
issue this dissertation addresses. 
Regarding the evolution of the endogenous technology approach, a 
complete model developed by Mundlak was used to illustrate the approach. In 
general the endogenous technology approach implies that other variables --
excluding input and output physical quantities -- called technology shifters have a 
key role on production function estimation. 
Additionally, research discussing the main variables which influence the 
supply (generation) and demand (adoption) of new technologies was reviewed. 
The literature reviewed documents the importance of public policy in the 
generation and adoption of new technologies. Because benefits from research in 
agriculture are difficult for private firms to capture, the role of public-supported 
research is evident. Consequently, the demand for research responds to private 
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and public factors, the latter being the result of the political-economic bargaining 
process among farmers, agribusinesses, and consumers. 
In Chapter Ill, several methodological issues related to the estimation of 
production response parameters were addressed. Alternative approaches to 
producers response estimation were discussed. It was concluded that 
econometric methods are best suited to the estimation of supply response 
parameters involving an endogenous technology approach. The robustness of 
the estimates will depend, among other things, on the support the model has 
from economic theory. Also, the better the representation of the technology 
underlying producers behavior, the higher the reliability and consistency of the 
estimates will be. The specification of the empirical model of this research 
considered the set of characteristics desirable on a production function such as 
flexibility, ease of interpretation, parsimonious in parameters, and ease of 
computation; it also considered the tradeoffs these characteristics impose. 
Finally, there is ample evidence in support of the endogenous technology 
approach as a consistent methodology to analyze the technology adoption 
process in agriculture. 
Although the Cobb-Douglas function initially was classified as non-flexible, 
recent research has shown that the introduction of the endogenous technical 
change hypothesis in a Cobb-Douglas environment allows a more flexible and 
consistent modeling structure. The endogenous technology approach brings into 
play potential theoretical and empirical traps which should be avoided by the 
researcher so as not to invalidate or make intractable the empirical analysis. 
In Chapter IV, the components of the empirical model are specified. The 
production function is specified as a Cobb-Douglas form with varying coefficients. 
This functional form has the following advantages: parsimonious in parameters, 
facile interpretation, consistent forecasting behavior, well-founded in economic 
theory, and flexible in its technology shifter parameters. The corresponding 
shortcomings and limitations are presented later. 
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The discussion on the form of government intervention variable(s) to be 
used as a technology shifter representing policy influences in technology 
adoption indicated that a measure of excess capacity is preferred over more 
conventional variables suggested by Houck and collaborators. Excess capacity, 
as an indicator of the amount of resources transferred to producers, fits into 
Mundlak•s capital accumulation requirement to speed technical adoption. The 
shortcomings of excess capacity also were addressed, namely the potential 
simultaneity problem generated by the fact that the excess capacity in itself is 
determined by government intervention. Another shortcoming of excess capacity 
is its inability to capture changes in the size of deficiency or diversion payments. 
The lag structure on research expenditures was assumed to have the 
traditional inverted V shape. However, a 30-year lag was considered 
appropriate, based on statistical results and new research by Pardey (1989), 
which suggests the length of the lag structure is longer than conventionally 
thought. 
In Chapter V, the empirical production function is estimated in two stages. 
First, factor share estimates were computed using an iterative seemingly 
unrelated equations estimator, which under the assumption of normal 
disturbances is considered a maximum likelihood estimator. As suggested by 
Tyner and Tweeten, a partial adjustment hypothesis was introduced to model the 
short-run inequality between factor shares and production elasticities. Next, the 
intercept equation was estimated using ordinary least squares and considering 
second-order, auto-correlated disturbances. Observations on the intercept were 
estimated as residuals of output. The estimated results showed good statistical 
properties. 
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From the statistical estimation, several measures relevant to technological 
change were calculated. Regarding the production elasticity, all government 
policy variables showed a positive sign and were highly significant, supporting 
the hypothesis that farm programs have positively contributed to the adoption of 
new technology in agriculture. 
The above results suggest that to actually estimate rates of return to 
research, the cost side should include the cost of government programs other 
than public research funding. Moreover, if farm programs have supported the 
implementation of new technology in agriculture, the cost of those programs also 
should be considered as a cost in a rate of return computation. 
A production elasticity of .18 was estimated for research expenditures; this 
estimate is significantly higher than the previous literature suggests. The size of 
this coefficient might be influenced by the positive impact on productivity of the 
government intervention variables and by the significant increase in lag length. 
Other significative results inclu~e the evidence favoring the hypothesis of a 
positive relationship between exports and technology adoption. This result can 
be understood as the positive role of exports in farmer capital accumulation. 
Given that increases in exports usually are accompanied by higher prices and 
higher net farm incomes, this result is consistent with historical observations. 
The estimated elasticity of production with respect to output price showed a 
negative sign. This result suggests a process in which producers adopt new 
technologies in a context of falling real output prices. Although the situation 
described contradicts the Induced Innovation Hypothesis, it is compatible with 
Cochrane's ''tread-mill" .hypothesis. Also, this sign is not surprising if under 
falling prices, the survivability of producers is threatened and therefore pressure 
to adopt cost-saving techniques is created. This negative sign in the production 
elasticity with respect to price does not imply a negative sign in the supply 
function. 
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Primal measures of Hicksian technical bias were computed. Regarding 
government intervention variables, the measured all were found to be labor-
using. This result provides some support for the hypothesis that government 
policies have eased the adjustment of labor out of agriculture. The bias due to 
research expenditures was found to be saving for real estate and variable inputs, 
and using for fixed inputs and labor. These results seem to contradict previous 
research regarding labor bias; however, due to the low statistical significance of 
the corresponding parameter, this contradiction might not be a problem. 
Also in Chapter V, a supply elastiqity function was developed, and the 
corresponding response parameters were estimated. According to the empirical 
findings, the changes in agricultural supply elasticity are related directly to 
changes in excess capacity, output price, export share and total cost or scale. In 
the other hand, the agricultural supply elasticity is inversely related to variations 
in government payments, income and weather. The effect of research 
expenditures was found to be as expected, increasing in time and moving toward 
a more elastic agricultural supply. 
Regarding the supply elasticity, the short-run average was estimated to be 
.40 while the intermediate term .87. Though the short-run parameteris high, is 
consistent with similar studies using a Cobb-Douglas; Griliches (1959) estimated 
.28 for the short run, and Tyner and Tweeten (1966) estimates were .45 and .84 
for the short and intermediate run respectively. These research supply 
elasticities also are consistent with more recent studies which emphasize 
technology issues. In Weaver (1983) the estimated supply elasticities were 
between .4 and . 73; Shumway (1983) produced estimates ranging from .25 to 
.72; finally Antle (1984) estimated a coefficient for the supply elasticity equal to 
.427. None of the last three studies employed a Cobb-Douglas production 
function. 
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Considering the production-response parameters estimated in Chapter VI, 
the relative weights of a government policy preference function for agriculture 
were estimated as an extension of previous work by Oehmke. The results 
indicate that both producers and consumers have benefited consistently from 
government policy, relative to taxpayers. The higher relative weight for 
producers over consumers surplus is consistent with the advantages of 
producers in terms of organization and vital interests. The persistent fiscal 
budget problems of the last decade is likely to affect consumers the most and 
producers the least. By reducing real public research funding, the consumer 
share of benefits is negatively affected. As long as producers are able to hold on 
to the benefits they get from farm programs, the public policy bias towards 
producers will increase. 
Topics for Further Research 
Many questions remain unanswered, and some results remain to be re-
evaluated. Here is a list of issues which need addressing. 
First, response parameters of the Cobb-Douglas production function are 
very sensitive to the size of the elasticities of production with respect to input use 
(qi) and could considerably bias other parameters sizes. Alternative production 
function functional forms need to be found while maintaining some of the 
advantages of the Cobb-Douglas form. 
Although excess capacity fits well under the endogenous technology 
approach used here, two limitations need to be addressed. First is the 
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simultaneity between policy variables and excess capacity. Second, is the need 
to completely represent the effects of government policies. 
The estimation of an elasticity function has brought new questions 
regarding the proper definition of the supply elasticity with respect to research 
expenditures. Although this is a question, closely related to the functional form 
chosen, the differentiation in the literature between production elasticity of 
research and supply elasticity of research is obscure. 
Regarding input and output price variables, arbitrary definitions based on 
past observations were used. There is a need to build price expectations closely 
within the framework of economic theory. Also, the relevance of including current 
price information should be reconsidered. 
Also, as has been suggested by others in the literature, public research 
expenditures should not be an exogenous variable. Its endogenization could 
provide valuable information in designing mechanisms which assure a steady 
technological development process. Also, private research expenditures need to 
be included in the analysis to account for all sources of production technologies. 
Finally, this research does not provide an estimate of the rate of return to 
research. Moreover, following the interest group theory as a driving force of 
government policy, the significance of the concept of rate of return as a 
mechanism to allocate public research funding has to be questioned. 
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DATA UTILIZED IN THE MODEL ESTIMATION 
Factor Share Factor Share Factor Share Factor Share Pncelndex Pncelndex Pnce Index Pncelndex Pnce Index PnceRat1o Pnce Rallo Excess Weather Farm Exports Total Coefficient of 
of of of cl of of of of of of of CapaCity Index Share Cost Income 
Year Real Estate Labor FIXed Vanable Real Estate Labor FIXed Inputs ~anable Input Output A EstNarlnp Labor/FIX lnp (FIVe Years of Inputs Vanabdlly 
Inputs Inputs (FIVe Years (FIVe Years (FIVe Years (FIVe Years (F1veYears (FIVe Years (F1veYears Mev .Average) $1977 
Mev .Average) Mev .Average) Mev Average) Mov.Average) Mev Average) Mov.Average) Mov.Average) Mdl1977$ M1lhon $ 
1944 023850 044386 0 09572 0 20072 0 85255 048978 0 79600 142735 142627 059699 060916 49994 10100 009115 9089890 1 34466 
1945 0 23987 044014 0 08509 020185 088639 056795 0 82150 146127 1.58781 060585 068229 -71 72 10680 011280 9229080 111227 
1946 022889 041747 0 06705 018939 092804 065888 0 83659 150544 1 75570 061438 0 78260 -18875 10080 012209 8161730 101769 
1947 023473 036716 007162 019741 0 94062 072646 0 82666 150213 185318 062665 088921 -12259 9650 010823 79023 00 1 01762 
1948 024895 035862 0 08750 021355 094888 073031 079632 147212 192188 064638 0 92390 120943 11840 010506 7986360 1 09333 
1948 027780 042039 012064 025022 0 94577 070365 0 76488 142791 1 88930 066473 0 92192 113514 9390 009707 82663 50 1 07956 
1950 027281 039812 012939 024329 092940 066855 0 73578 137255 1 80976 067926 0 90806 95728 10230 010304 8295810 1.22653 
1951 024941 033994 012501 022891 091009 062565 072051 131363 1 72756 089305 0 87150 88962 10090 010587 8595640 125301 
1952 026657 036600 014242 025348 092288 059700 073782 130606 1.70645 070661 0 80933 1487 sa- 9580 007467 8789910 111320 
1953 028430 038941 015873 027001 0 93254 061866 075795 130589 1 64236 071417 0 81552 1520 66 9580 008523 8464130 1 07862 
1954 029788 041271 016839 028130 0 93124 064571 078959 129081 158043 0.72155 0 83859 191937 9610 009198 8382020 116673 
1955 030537 035658 017596 029118 093185 067272 077088 127773 1 55036 072961 0 87296 3008 78 10420 010443 7659170 1.16399 
1956 0 30135 034798 017818 029345 092565 066401 076805 125013 148461 0.74092 086413 386716 8940 013923 7449790 113251 
1957 031420 035585 018547 030153 0 90794 065150 0 78082 121327 1.38007 074901 085525 3744 55 10320 011507 73292.50 1.12142 
1958 027292 030495 016459 026968 0 88916 063780 0.75318 117014 1 28787 076066 0 84580 398432 11380 009546 7337760 106168 
1959 029080 032182 017991 029312 087825 062700 0 75220 113867 1 23677 077210 0 83288 383448 9600 011921 7421630 111065 
1960 028680 027355 017995 028502 0 86827 061036 0 75619 110614 1.18524 078560 080676 4035 56 10820 012818 7029610 116776 
1961 027989 027159 017443 027964 0 86333 060867 076350 108403 115452 079683 079729 4433 65 10230 012682 7050120 1.18230 
1962 027649 027408 017237 027777 0 86082 061551 077259 1 06806 113552 080615 079698 485707 9740 011993 71031 50 1 06062 
1963 027594 024825 017361 027943 0 85766 062058 0 78040 105501 112580 081307 0 79533 4488 39 10510 013992 8960650 104012 
1964 0 28718 024906 018330 029479 085424 061374 0 78673 104152 110448 082030 0 78007 4862 97 10073 014412 6916440 1 03918 
1985 029161 022863 017761 028602 0 85020 060940 0 79014 1 03085 109107 082492 077114 502423 10385 013098 7093680 112333 
1966 0 28278 022724 017405 028301 0 85779 061655 079326 102391 108131 083794 0 77728 4924 14 9965 013228 7260970 112859 
1967 029834 021529 018849 030717 0 86793 063142 079568 101474 107931 085551 0 79356 472719 101 50 013403 72291 00 116236 
1968 028784 022137 018895 029222 0 87831 063139 0 79798 100559 1 05947 087370 0 79122 4986 22 10329 012172 7202850 110651 
1969 028427 021787 018584 028229 0 88646 064689 0 79833 0 98911 1 03863 069711 0 81023 4902 31 10387 010178 7099500 114942 
1970 029841 022513 019086 028852 0 89629 066687 079647 096706 1 02305 092870 0 83738 442294 98 82 011427 7084640 1 06650 
1971 028747 027545 018857 029182 0 89348 069685 079344 093896 1 00532 095369 087859 437812 10609 012489 7490080 1 06662 
1972 025461 023032 016875 025817 0 88771 075402 079177 090958 096625 097794 0 95307 4083 62 10770 011311 7474020 104562 
1973 020100 017149 012930 021565 088608 080929 079125 088302 096617 100456 1 02277 332921 10604 013044 8042480 117489 
1974 023015 018609 015486 028435 0 90322 086004 079556 088278 104198 102312 1 08000 267310 9282 021673 8549920 1 54605 
1975 023236 018414 017888 029247 0 92723 089939 0 80942 092351 111804 100810 111116 2666 75 9975 021451 85689 50 1 36976 
1976 023865 022229 0 20561 032883 0 95284 092851 083895 097542 115981 098477 1.11182 2309 37 9623 021519 8749510 1 35338 
1977 027126 022042 021774 033411 0 96326 094297 087787 101438 119326 095671 1 07785 2210 78 10089 022042 8861910 1 31500 
1978 024424 018672 019638 030836 0 98458 095990 091811 104395 119174 094703 1 04867 2129 79 10441 021245 8937690 1 29277 
1979 023369 018996 018245 029404 0 99010 096157 095377 105413 112967 094184 1 00938 2456 85 11079 021218 94311 00 111838 
1980 026351 018059 0 20317 033747 099535 097620 0 98617 103521 108167 096440 0 98990 199731 9668 027119 95292.70 113181 
1981 026238 015845 0 20145 032843 1 00553 099183 1 00567 1 02777 1 06085 097967 0 98671 278345 10965 026322 9154770 145329 
1982 027050 017608 021249 031291 102841 095353 101633 103168 1 03794 099782 0 93889 3567 20 10911 023916 8712910 142599 
1983 032206 016958 0 25106 035475 103195 093547 1 02584 103331 1 01724 099972 0 91257 3384 25 9280 022701 7972980 1 30339 
1984 027024 018908 0 20466 031995 1 02940 088053 1 03812 103321 098343 099724 084980 400518 10257 022348 8168300 1 57887 
1985 027799 020083 0 20262 031767 1.01541 086524 1 04847 101936 093556 099757 082621 626854 10847 019152 7610960 1 58077 
1986 030199 025334 021389 0.34251 098717 0.86268 1 05045 097961 0 87247 100875 082189 598947 10350 016695 7259010 1 59523 
1987 028027 024507 018142 032026 0 95247 091315 1 04032 093382 081793 1 02055 088149 533533 10836 016497 7138810 1 04670 
1988 028637 025354 018140 032444 0 87650 096558 1 02475 089472 078096 097565 094950 5090 32 9221 020316 7129300 1 22524 
1989 026056 024069 016274 032741 0 80848 107467 1 01196 086095 0.75787 093389 1 06704 4669 81 10224 020956 7369900 120924 
...... 
01 ...... 
Share of Percentage Output Real Estate Labor 
Gov. Pay of Quantity Quantity Quantity 
Year on Population (Log) (Log) (Log) 
Net Farm on Farms $1977 $1977 $1977 
Income % M1lhon $ Mdhon $ M1ll1on$ 
1944 005496 736994 10 79180 1002580 1090810 
1945 006630 714796 10 77450 1004379 1084040' 
1946 006027 728430 1080580 1006640 1079840 
1947 005123 721721 10.75230 1007560 1098500 
1948 002045 709413 1984410 1008030 1094780 
1949 001455 670241 10 84420 1009080 1094180 
1950 001455 652804 1083470 1009600 1086240 
1951 002073 615684 10 87140 1009690 1080920 
1952 001795 579618 1090380 1009490 1075280 
1953 001838 557644 1090400 100933b 1068120 
1954 001841 535714 1090340 1009060 1084960 
1955 002077 508167 1094240 1008940 1066920 
1956 002026 469679 1094810 1007140 1062370 
1957 004923 443666 10 93880 1006670 10.53490-
1958 009157 430787 1102050 1005660. 10.45980 
1959 008263 410343 1103620 1006690 1046730 
1960 006366 392699 1106220 1006450 1042830 
1961 006270 375612 11 06320 1008400 1037020-
1962 012486 359057 1107710 1006890 1034490 
1963 014473 3.43370 1110850 1007020 1029120 
1984 014410 317874 11 09960 1007680 1024420 
1965 020768 2.88066 1114090 1006610 1021630 
1966 019094 2.64496 11.11630 1006310 1012340 
1967 023474 2.46479 1117010 10 07330 1009130 
1968 024946 2.34180 1118770. 1008470 1005670 
1969 028103 < 2.26936 1119730 1005860 1000920 
1970 026537 2.19405 1118750 1008450 9 95961 
1971 025874 2.11844 1128410 1006710 9 92110 
1972 020950 2.09824 11 26080 1005880 993422 
1973 020363 2.02926 11 28090 1004640 992110 
1974 007588 2.05704 11 20400 1003280 992093 
1975 001944 199074 1130880 1001030 9 89841 
1976 003159 2.01835 1131840 1002570 9 83733 
1977 003838 190736 11 34950 10.04480 9 83729 
1978 009144 179695 11 38400 1005340 9 83730 
1979 012020 168814 1144580 1009200 9 92291 
1980 005023 162423 11 38780 1008970 979335 
1981 0 08066 158454 1151670 1009550 979269 
1992 007219 146237 1149340 1007850 976141 
1983 015337 136286 1131070 1006900 9 80744 
1984 077003 130802 1146320 1005200 975488 
1985 027390 121187 11 50670 1004710 9 67355 
1986 025251 111755 1144720 '1002980 961410 
1987 038766 1.10701 1144890 1032680 9.58441 
1988 040345 113775 11.37320 1030850 955594 
1989 034435 1.16606 11.48080 1030460 9 56883 
APPENDIX A. (CONTINUED} 
Foced Inputs Var.lnputs Research Net Farm 
Quantity Quantity Expend~ures Income 
(Log) (Log) (POL: Variable) (POL Variable 11) 
$1977 $1977 (Both ends Constrained (Far end Constrained) 
M1ll1on$ Mllhon $ Mlll10n 1977$ Mllhon 1977$ 
. 920669 939636 -847224 ·1108530 
920005 9.41238 -882410 -1166250 
909497 946167 -918518 -1346350 
916862 953662 -955906 -1568410 
930569 958461 -994902 -1694280 
944066 963810 ·1036398 .-1608860 
954037 962828 ·1080174 ·1585430 
9.61361 969357 ·1125270 -1565530 
966348 ,973181 ·1171344 -1448810 
968807 974251 ·1217792 -1474930 
970022 974065 ·1284508 --1194360 
970946 9 78423 -1312370 ·1181200 
970378 978134 ·1361668 ·1217590 
968161 978947 ·1413746 -1127690 
967371 981965 ·1469442 ·1027310 
968468 9.86883 ·1529508 -966848 
969311 985220 ·1593676 -888163 
967482 985849 ·1663282 -868236 
966926 9 88030 ·1737666 ·842381 
966943 990211 ·1816540 -911095 
968035 992484 ·1900248 < ·784351 
968861 991766 -1988326 -803842 
970382 9'96168 -2080968 -339982 
973192 1001400 ·2178386 -825565 
975091 1003030 ·2279400 ·795932 -
975461 1004640 ·2382546 -743925 
975939 1005470 ·2488490 -813169 
9.74969 1010600 ·2596119 -828672 
975932 1011990 ·2704947 -787561 
9m63 1018030 ·2814177 ·880611 
979988 1016060 ·2922177 -944792 
983278 1012060 -3029493 -914450 
9 81830 1022270 -3136303 -856663 
982503 1025320 ·3243712 -894033 
983910 1030490 ·3352698 -1194300 
986057 1035370 -3484042 -954637 
986288 10 29990 -3577973 -809869 
983628 1029420 -3694339 -670356 
980828 1023360 ·3811599 ·619016 
975157 1017180 ·3926767 -629258 
967072 1025440 -4038928 -846502 
9.61130 1019970 -4146958 -467426 
9.55776 10.18850 -4250490 -597900 
9.47309 1021810 -4352175 -568683 
942514 1020890 -4453333 -462890 
938708 1028060 -4554673 -690680 
Net Farm Net Farm 
'Income Income 
(POL Variable 12) (POL Variable In 
(Far end Constrained) (Both ends Constrained 







































































































Year Gross Net D1rect Excess Agncultural GNP Real Labor F1xed Vanable Agncullural 
Farm farm Government Capacity Exports Deflator Estate Inputs Inputs Output 
Income mcome Payments (million$) (m1ll10n$) 1982 Pnce Pnce Pnce Pnce Pnce 
(million$) Billion$ Billion$ Index Index Index Index Index 
(1),(4) (1) (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (6) (6) (6) (6) 
1940 11340 45 072 23350 350 1300 0156 0073 0146 0265 0213 
1941 14271 65 054 4380 1032 1380 0168 0091 0152 0280 0278 
1942 19893 99 065 6650 1497 14 70 0190 0121 0183 0320 0352 
1943 23944 11 7 065 -32490 2305 1510 0212 0157 0195 0345 0443 
1944 24038 11 7 078 50490 2191 1530 0225 0173 0205 0355 0439 
1945 25374 123 074 -384.80 2857 1570 0235 0194 0194 0372 0472 
1946 29568 15.1 077 -10710 3610 1940 0257 0225 0199 0389 0536 
1947 32386 154 031 208 60 3505 22.10 0299 0188 0226 0431 0648 
1948 35454 17 7 026 1827 70 3830 2360 0326 0199 0250 0462 0614 
1949 30762 128 019 64580 2986 2350 0317 0205 0264 0449 0538 
1950 33103 136 028 -901 so 3411 2390 0324 0220 0268 0462 0568 
1951 38282 159 029 -63770 4053 2510 0356 0238 0290 0490 0659 
1952 37751 150 028 1753 00 2819 25 50 0364 0259 0299 0497 0607 
1953 34447 130 021 2068 90 2936 2590 0355 0270 0297 0478 0555 
1954 34181 124 026 1501 80 3144 2630 0356 0282 0298 0477 0531 
1955 33476 113 023 117540 3496 2720 0356 0233 0300 0470 0496 
1956 33959 113 055 107810 4728 2810 0362 0241 0309 0471 0500 
1957 34788 11 1 102 1735 40 4003 2910 0374 0265 0325 0474 0498 
1958 38958 13 2 1 09 2901 50 3719 29 70 0383 0286 0338 0479 0535 
1959 37890 10 7 068 139750 4517 3040 0389 0289 0353 0478 0508 
1960 38587 11 2 070 179690 4946 3090 0393 0260 0357 0483 0505 
1961 40547 12.0 149 2119 80 5142 3120 0396 0283 0364 0486 0521 
1962 42343 121 1 75 290590 5078 31 90 0403 0303 0374 0489 0531 
1963 43368 11 8 1 70 2277 80 6068 32.40 0409 0295 0384 0490 0525 
1964 42304 10 5 218 2428 00 6097 3290 0411 0302 0390 0492 0515 
1965 46549 12.9 246 2370 50 6097 3380 0449 0303 0399 0511 0525 
1966 50468 140 328 211770 6676 3500 0471 0356 0415 0 521 0581 
1967 50520 123 308 2745 00 6771 3590 0481 0341 0427 0525 0538 
1968 51847 12.3 346 3375 90 6311 3770 0499 0387 0448 0524 0564 
1969 56408 143 3 79 268910 5741 3980 0527 0424 0467 0 529 0593 
1970 58818 144 372 144980 6721 4200 0549 0469 0466 0 547 0610 
1971 62119 15 0 315 253860 7758 4440 0578 0641 0521 0564 0607 
1972 71145 19 5 396 246900 8047 4650 0617 0632 0552 0589 0729 
1973 98910 344 261 1731 70 12902 4950 0718 0695 0605 0688 1040 
1974 98247 273 053 101630 21293 5400 0811 0733 0689 0882 1092 
1975 100590 25 5 0 81 2019 00 21578 5930 0888 0791 0816 1 001 1043 
1976 102917 202 073 193240 22147 6310 0870 0979 0923 0985 1001 
1977 108765 199 182 3080 50 23974 6730 1000 1000 1000 1 000 1000 
1978 128447 252 303 2091 40 27289 7220 1077 1022 1073 1 058 1166 
1979 150720 - 274 1 38 3389.10 31979 7860 1 211 1153 1192 1173 1338 
1980 149274 16.1 .129 -800 40481 8570 1348 1242 1304 1 399 1397 
1981 166323 269 1 93 836880 43780 9400 1456 1.190 1449 1494 1340 
1982 163474 - 235 ---- 349 10400.10 _ 39_097 - 100 00 _ 1.512 --1.352- - _1556 1.498 135!) 
1983 153160 153 9.30 1597 40 34769 10390 1 531 1047 1639 1 521 1373 
1984 170159 263 843 9612.20 38027 107.70 1.547 1457 1716 1496 1396 
1985 162912 31 0 771 18638 00 31201 11090 1 511 - 1586 1703- 1483 1263 
1986 156524 31.0 .11.81 760300 '26132 113.80 1470 .1.868 1668 1.422 1.179 
1987 168973 41.3 16 75 6678 70 27876 117 40 1113 2.044 1 691 1 418 1293 -- -
1988 173838 418 1448 -343 05 35316 121 30 1173 , .. 2.205 1798 1472 1413 
1989 189219 467 1089 732641 39652 -: 126.30 1.217' 2.346 1903 1 566 - 1441 
. -
-' .-,c . '- ' - ' -
SOURCES ~ -- - - .. --·-· - . -- •. , __ 
(1) Johnson, Cheryl 0 'A H1stoncal Look at Farm Income' 8#807 ERS USDA May,1990 , , 
(2) • Dvoskln, Dan. "Excess Capacrty: 1n US Agnculture An Economic Approach to Measurement' ·AGE CON 
Report#580 ERS USDA February, 1988 Data for 1985-89 was estunated us1ng USDA sources, 
(3) AgncuRural Stal!sllcs, vanous Issues. ' 
(4) For 1980-89the sourc_e_ IS Eq[FS,~atlonal Fmanc1al §>ummary, 1989 ·-- , __ . _. 
(5) 'Econon11c Report to the Prestdent'1991 
(6) Aggregated 1rom ERS data. 
APPENDIX B. (CONTINUED) 
Year Research Agncultural Year Research Agncultural 
Expendtlures Research Expendttures Research 
SAES&USDA Dellalor SAES&USDA Deflator 
$ $ 
1890 1203386 6826 1940 40860472 12396 
1891 1178065 6749 1941 41261687 12613 
1892 1253475 6425 1942 42390744 12829 
1893 1315528 6526 1943 43453178 13382 
1894 1360765 6198 1944 46215934 14 371 
1895 1397128 6330 1945 48107365 14478 
1896 1520416 6257 1946 53024382 15 505 
1897 1531991 6336 1947 66096no 16995 
1898 1643664 6501 1948 80391010 18 747 
1899 16628n 6704 1949 94333076 19362 
1900 1837557 6 901 1950 102676412 20468 
1901 2048583 6874 1951 107067850 22032 
1902 2281594 7006 1952 112472534 23333 
1903 2495866 7043 1953 117082152 24416 
1904 2613086 7134 1954 1245m12 25431 
1905 2724902 7 235 1955 141314077 26038 
1906 3401860 7322 1956 155646244 27033 
1907 4091321 7 542 1957 182076407 28427 
1908 5162263 7416 1958 205835037 29650 
1909 6195384 7738 1959 228630872 30885 
1910 6700749 7 886 1960 243032555 33025 
1911 6638676 7792 1961 273466192 34202 
1912 8160143 7680 1962 281597196 35586 
1913 8285391 8013 1963 303461288 37180 
1914 9090937 8009 1964 348041935 38708 
1915 11034683 8114 1965 385588620 40438 
1916 10366331 8 719 1966 419996692 42261 
1917 10849949 9912 1967 452372053 44425 
1918 11n8303 10.717 1968 468906072 48767 
1919 13208146 11 938 1969 483929235 50547 
1920 14722104 13026 1970 530900992 54 301 
1921 14921547 11754 1971 574170952 57 561 
1922 15734901 12257 1972 615692496 60064 
1923 17107068 12537 1973 659639490 63796 
1924 17922738 12538 1974 700039887 68 541 
1925 19056330 12835 1975 800893000 73298 
1926 2125n88 12833 1976 888052000 n991 
1927 22771802 12806 19n 996626000 81115 
1928 25329858 12927 1978 1100662000 86082 
1929 28607064 12849 1979 1224005000 92312 
1930 31334402 12725 1980 1333885000 100000 
1931 33671585 12747 1981 1491757000 109 019 
1932 33113454 12638 1982 1625271000 117855 
1933 28610162 12281 1983 1700257000 128 618 
1934 24885341 12091 1984 1784769000 133 003 
1935 25771850 11 642 1985 1888348000 140660 
1936 29941224 11 743 1986 1981692911 149 258 
1937 33226558 12215 1987 2127685601 146407 
1938 36956846 12.179 1988 2267562900 151 468 
1939 43138831 12262 1989 2410366898 157 949 
SOURCES· 
1890-1986 Pardey, P G, W M Eveleens, and M L Hallaway. 'A'Stattsltcal HtStOI}' of US 
Agncultural Research 1889 to 1986 • St. Paul. Untverstly of Mtnnesota, CIFAP, 
forthcomtng, 1991 
1987·1989. Collected from USDA, 'Current Research lnforrnatton System, CRIS • 





Daniel Gerardo De La Torre Ugarte Pierrend 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis : GOVERNMENT POLICY AND TECHNICAL CHANGE: AN 
ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGY STUDY OF U.S. AGRICULTURE 
Major Field: Agricul_tural Economics 
Biographical: 
Personal Data : Born in Lima, Peru, September 24, 1958, the son of 
Miguel A. and Antonieta L. De La Torre Ugarte. 
Education : Graduated from Colegio de Ia lnmaculada, Lima, Peru, in 
December 1975; received Bachelor:of Science Degree in Economics 
from Universidad Del Pacffico, Lima, Peru, in March, 1984; received 
Master of Science Degree from Oklahoma State University in 
December, 1987; completed requirements for the Doctor of 
Philosophy Degree at Oklahoma State University in May, 1992. 
v''> ~c ~ ' >; I I 
Professionai-Experienoe:" -Professional Technical Assistant, Technology 
. Policy Group, Junta Del Acuerdo de Cartagena, August, 1981 to 
December; 1983. ,·Research Associate, Universidad Del Pacifico 
,_Research' Center, J~nu(;!ry"·19e_4lo March, ·1985. Consultant, United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization, October,. 1984, to 
December, 1984, and August, 1986. Consultant, Agricultural Policy 
Analysis Project-AID, August, 1987. Graduate Research Assistant, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, 
January, 1988 to May, 1988. Chief Financial Officer, Ralston Purina 
Peru, August, 1988 to May, 1990. Graduate Research Assistant, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, 
July, 1990 to September, 1991. 
